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TASK FORCE ON LABOUR RELATIONS

(under the Privy Council Office)

STUDY NO. 15

WILDCAT STRIKE IN LAKE CITY

BY

MAXWELL FLOOD

M. A. (McGILL)

Department of Sociology & Anthropology
McMaster University

OTTAWA

OCTOBER 1968

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FOREWORD

This is a case study of a wildcat strike and it constitutes one part of a much wider study of the phenomenon which is now nearing completion by the author. While this study is complete in that it documents and analyzes one particular occurrence of the phenomenon, it is incomplete in the sense that the more general analytical framework and typology that has been developed is not presented here. However, the general theoretical framework is presented in sufficient detail to ground the subsequent analysis.

While this study is subject to all the limitations of a case study, it is my judgment that it is typical of one of the types of wildcat strikes that frequently occurs; in this sense some degree of generalization is possible. Other types of wildcat strikes have been identified and discussed, in a preliminary manner elsewhere and those interested may refer to this broader treatment.*

* Maxwell Flood, "Some New Reflections on Wildcat Strikes", in Summation, June, 1968, No. 1, (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University, Social Science Research Bureau), pp. 1-14.

The nature of this study makes it very difficult to properly acknowledge the contribution of a great number of persons whose anonymity must be protected. In general, it may be said that many of the informal leaders in the local union concerned overcame their natural suspicion, in sufficient measure, to discuss the event with me. Without this cooperation the study could not have progressed and my gratitude to these persons is very great. Some union officers managed to overcome their hesitancy to discuss the situation as it was still evolving, and my thanks is extended to them. It is to be hoped that the results of this research will justify the faith they showed in social investigation.

The company also provided a measure of cooperation and my thanks is extended to them along with the hope that they, too, will come to accept more readily the utility of sociological inquiry.

My greatest debt, and one which extends over a number of years, is to my mentor and academic adviser Professor William H. Form of Michigan State University. It gives me pleasure to express my appreciation and thanks for the guidance that he has always extended so willingly.

Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the assistance and interest of many members of the rank and file in the local union that was studied. In many ways, it is their study.

Maxwell Flood

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I

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
'LAKE STEEL COMPANY WILDCAT STRIKE'

1966

- May 24
(Tuesday) First meeting between the union Negotiating Committee and company representatives to discuss new contract.
- June 21
(Tuesday) From May 24 to June 20, twelve meetings took place for the purpose of negotiation.
- Also during this period, the union proposed that the matters in discussion be referred to governmental mediation. The company refused to agree to this. The union, thereupon, applied for conciliation services from the provincial government; the company did not oppose this application.
- Union distributed a leaflet to members advising them of developments and calling for their full support and cooperation. Members advised to ignore rumours and to wait for official reports.
- July 8
(Friday) Company made offer to the Union.
- July 12
(Tuesday) Negotiating Committee reported offer to the Union Executive Committee. Indicated their intention to reject the offer. Company offer regarded as falling short in the areas of pensions, supplemental unemployment benefits, group insurance and training.
- July 13
(Wednesday) Negotiating Committee reported its actions to membership meeting. Action taken endorsed by the membership.
- July 21
(Thursday) Union distributed leaflet to members advising them of the rejection of the company offer.

Also, advised that the provincial Minister of Labour had established a Conciliation Board.

July 22 (Friday) Union issued press release concerning the establishment of Conciliation Board.

July 26 (Tuesday) Union distributed leaflet to members informing them that the Minister of Labour had appointed Judge C. as chairman of the Conciliation Board. Leaflet also advised members that conciliation hearings would commence in Toronto on Friday, July 29, and that in the interim, union and company representatives would continue their meetings in an effort to resolve as many items as possible prior to conciliation.

July 31 (Monday) Existing contract expired.

August 3 (Wednesday) Union Negotiating Committee returned to Lake City from meetings with management and Conciliation Board to report to meeting of union stewards.

Negotiating Committee announced to stewards meeting that an agreement had been made with management either to complete new contract or announce deadlock by August 7. This prepared the way for a legal strike at an early date.

August 3 9-10 P.M. Small group of men (Approximately 20) initiated the wildcat strike.

News of wildcat conveyed to stewards meeting; some stewards leave to join pickets.

Pickets joined by others coming off shift.

10:30 - Incoming night shift observed picket lines.

11:00 P.M.

August 4 (Thursday) Picket lines maintained. Union stewards attempted to persuade strikers to desist. Stewards rejected by strikers.

Groups from original picket line moved to several subsidiary plants and closed them down during the night. Sabotage and violence employed in closing down one of these plants.

August 4 (Thursday) Early in the morning, the President of the local and other union officers appeared at the picket lines and exhorted the strikers to return to work. Union officers shouted down and insulted.

Union attempted to regain control of the situation by distribution of a leaflet stating that there was

no authorized strike at the Lake Steel Company. Employees urged to return to work at their normal shift by union.

Union officers participated in "open-line" type radio program.

Picket lines maintained.

- August 5 (Friday) Union invited each main gate at the plant (4) to elect spokesman to attend meeting with union executive to discuss complaints.
- Fourteen dissident leaders eventually held meeting with union executive. Arrangements for the general membership meeting discussed. This was arranged for Sunday, August 7, in the local football stadium.
- August 7 (Sunday) General membership meeting. State of negotiations outlined. Vote taken resulting in decision to return to work Monday, August 8.
- August 8 (Monday) Resumption of work.
- Management dismissed 35 men for sabotage and picket line violence; 16 men suspended indefinitely.
- Union distributed leaflet exhorting men to remain at work.
- August 9 (Tuesday) Conciliation Board meetings resumed in Toronto.
- August 10 (Wednesday) Union distributed leaflet announcing resumption of conciliation proceedings. Men urged to remain at work.
- Union distributed leaflet assuring that as soon as there was something to report from the meetings with the conciliator that a recommendation would be put to the membership.
- August 17 (Wednesday) First Memorandum of Agreement signed by company and union negotiators.
- August 21 (Sunday) One of the opposition groups distributed a leaflet at the plant urging the men to reject the contract on the grounds that to accept the contract would be an exchange for the jobs and livelihoods of the 51 men dismissed.
- August 22 (Monday) Contract referendum vote conducted at plant gates and Union Hall. The Negotiating Committee and the Union Executive unanimously recommended acceptance of the company proposal.

Proposed contract rejected by the membership by a margin of 53% to 47%.

- August 23 (Tuesday) Union distributed leaflet intimating that they had asked the Minister of Labour to release the report of the Conciliation Board immediately and also that the Negotiating Committee and Executive Committee were making the necessary arrangements to conduct a strike vote.
- August 26 (Friday) Revised memorandum of agreement signed by parties.
- August 29 (Monday) Union distributed leaflet intimating an amended contract proposal of 3 cents per hour more on the first year and indicating that a "no" vote would be authorization to call a strike on Saturday, September 3, 1966. Vote to be taken on Tuesday, August 30.
- Anti-administration group held meeting in Steelworkers' Hall. Arrangements made to distribute leaflet "Think Before You Vote" stating that the meeting had taken place and that it was decided by this group that the first condition of a new contract would have to be the reinstatement of the 51 men who had been discharged.
- August 30 (Tuesday) Ballot to accept the company offer or to authorize strike for Saturday, September 3.
- Company offer accepted by almost two-to-one vote.
- September 2 (Friday) Basic agreement signed by company and union representatives.

II

THE COURSE OF THE WILDCAT STRIKE

The Formal Process Preceding the Wildcat Strike

The existing contract between the Lake Steel Company and the Union - Local 08 United Steelworkers of America - was due to expire on July 31, 1966.

On May 24, 1966, negotiations for a new contract began between the parties. From May 24 to June 20, 1966, twelve negotiation sessions were held. During this period the Union proposed that the matters under discussion be referred to the government for mediation. The company refused to give their consent to this and the Union, therefore, applied for conciliation services from the provincial government. The company did not oppose this application for conciliation services by the Union.

On July 21, 1966, the Union distributed a leaflet to its members advising them of what had transpired in the negotiation process up to this point. This leaflet provided information on the collective bargaining process that the parties were

engaged in and also provided details of the procedures which the Union was required to follow under the Ontario Labour Relations Act.1/

On July 8, 1966, the company made an offer of settlement to the Union's Negotiating Committee. The Negotiating Committee considered this offer and decided to reject it. This was reported, in the first instance, to the Union Executive Committee on July 12, 1966, and the following day to a general membership meeting of the Union. The action by the Negotiating Committee was endorsed by both of these groups.

On July 21, the Negotiating Committee of the union distributed a leaflet to all members advising them of this development. They also advised that they had received notice from the provincial Minister of Labour stating that a conciliation board had been established.2/

On the following day, July 22, 1966, the Union issued a press release concerning the establishment of the Conciliation Board. On July 26, the Union Negotiating Committee once again issued a leaflet to be distributed to all members at the plant gates. The essential information conveyed in this leaflet comprised three main points:

1. that Judge C. had been appointed chairman of the Conciliation Board;
2. that sittings of the Conciliation Board would commence in the provincial capital on July 29, 1966; and

3. that in the meantime, the company and the union would continue their meetings in an effort to resolve as many items as possible before the sittings of the Board began.

The Negotiating Committee also indicated in this leaflet that they were "maintaining the objective, endorsed by the membership, of a fair, equitable and speedy settlement to the negotiations".3/

The conciliation proceedings commenced in the provincial capital on July 29, 1966. The tenor of these negotiations is indicated from a company statement indicating that: "an air of optimism existed in the latter stages of negotiation conducted with the aid of a Conciliation Board."4/ The pressure that the company felt to conclude a new agreement without delay is indicated by a statement made by a company officer who was participating in the conciliation process: "We were close to a settlement at the time that the wildcat strike erupted. We knew there was unrest in the Local - we knew that we could not protract negotiations - so we made an offer early."5/

The Union Negotiating Committee also appeared to have recognized the build up of pressure for a settlement within the Local. The slogan that they utilized at the bottom of all their leaflets constituted an appeal for the support and cooperation of the membership. Members were also advised in these leaflets not to listen to rumours, but to await official reports of developments.

On August 3, 1966, the Union Negotiating Committee returned to Lake City from their meetings with management and the Conciliation Board to report developments to a meeting of stewards and members. At this meeting it was announced that an agreement had been made with management either to conclude a new contract or to announce a deadlock by August 7, 1966 - only four days hence. This agreement cleared the way either for a new contract or a legal strike by the union membership within approximately two weeks. While this meeting was in progress news was conveyed to the officers that a wildcat strike had erupted at the company's main plant.

The Eruption of the Wildcat Strike

According to a company record of events, the wildcat began with an incident involving four cranemen in the Hot Strip Finishing Department of the main works at approximately 9:00 p.m. on August 3, 1966. These men left their work stations without authorization. When ordered to return to work they refused to do so and left the plant. The company record states:

almost simultaneously, in what appeared to be a well executed plan, pickets appeared at the various entrances to the works carrying signs stating 'no contract, no work'.

Events were a bit more complicated than this company assessment would suggest, according to interviews conducted with some of the original strikers. One informant said that the young men in this department (Hot Strip Finishing Department) had been talking about pulling a wildcat for about a

week prior to the event. This information had the type of job that required that he move around this department. He said that he noted early in the shift that groups were engaging in discussions. "At 7:00 p.m. people gathered in the lunchroom - this was unusual - mostly they go outside in the summer." During the lunch period the men were discussing the negotiations and the general views expressed were that there was not enough information about what was going on and people felt that the negotiations were not going well. During this period a worker came in and reported that one of the foremen had said: "you guys haven't got the guts to walk out!" My informant said that their response was: "let's show the-----!"6/ He described subsequent events in the Hot Strip Finishing Department as follows:

We went back to work after lunch. You could see from where I sat that things were happening. The cranes pulled down to their stopping places. They were all manned by young men. Then the other workers began to gather. They jumped up and went to the office area. There were about 35 to 40 men on the floor at this time - only 20 or so walked out - the rest just stood there. We went to the change house. We talked about where we were going from there. The union steward came in and said that we should go back and settle it the union way. We said that we weren't going back. We then went to the Cold Mill and Old Plate Shop Mill and tried to persuade them to walk out. I didn't see anybody join us. We went to the gate about 10:00 p.m. Pickets had started to form. I thought we couldn't have been the first ones out. I stayed all night at the gate.7/

From a variety of sources it was clearly established that this group of approximately 20 young men, who all worked in the same department, were the people who initiated the wild-

cat. Some time between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. on the evening of August 3rd, news was received at the union meeting that the wildcat had started. Immediately a number of stewards who were in attendance at this meeting left the Union Hall and proceeded to the plant. It was reported to me that a number of these stewards had picket signs in the trunks of their cars. These had been prepared in advance of the wildcat. The company report has noted that almost simultaneously with the walk-out of the young men from the particular department where the wildcat initiated, pickets appeared at the various entrances to the works equipped with picket signs.8/ The groups who were picketing the various entrances to the plant were joined by other people as they came off shift shortly after 10:30 p.m. The incoming shift observed the picket lines as they were coming on between 10:30 and 11:00. In the early hours of the wildcat, groups from the original picket line at the main plant moved to two subsidiary plants and closed them down. The company reported that by 10:30 p.m. the pickets were then so numerous that access to the main plant through various gates had been completely blocked. It was the company view that within a very short time a "mob" was beginning to develop as the number of pickets rapidly increased and they felt that violence would be inevitable.9/

At approximately 11:00 p.m. several members of senior management attempted to enter the plant to direct an orderly shutdown of operations; they were physically prevented from gaining access. They received verbal abuse and some were

pushed away from the plant entrances. The company was very concerned with the situation since they felt a great need to get personnel into the plant in order to shut down operations with a minimum amount of damage to equipment. In view of the fact that the plant was accessible by water, the company immediately employed boats to attempt to get key personnel into the plant. This tactic became evident to the picketers and carloads of men from the main gates began cruising around the various docking sites harassing and preventing personnel from going aboard boats bound for the plant. The growth and development of mob psychology during the night is indicated by one section of the company report which states:

the explosiveness of the atmosphere intensified throughout the remainder of the night as the mob at the entrances to the plant became more boisterous and several incidents of violence occurred. Extensive property damage was inflicted on cars parked in the vicinity of the plant and docking areas.10/

Early in the morning of August 4, at approximately 2:40 a.m., some of the picketers from the main gates attempted to bring out some of the departments which were still working in the main property. A group of about 30 men entered the reinforcing department in an attempt to bring out those workers who were still at their jobs there. These men threatened the supervisory staff with violence if they did not immediately close down the operation. They ignored an order to leave the company property and remained in the building attempting to intimidate employees who had remained at their jobs. During this incident damage to material and equipment occurred.11/

By the morning of August 4, all the company's operations were effectively shut down by the picketers; this included the main plant plus four other plants in the district. By this time some 3,000 men were involved in the various picket lines. When office workers arrived at the plant in the morning they were prohibited from entering the company property by the pickets. City police had been called to the scene and had attempted to open the picket lines, but had failed.

Early the next morning, the president of the local union and two other members of the executive council of the union arrived at the gates and attempted to persuade the workers to open the picket lines and allow people to go to work. The content of the local president's plea was that the strike was illegal; that the union was not behind them; and that the men should open the line and let the day shift in. He also pointed out that if workers were not allowed in to close down the furnaces there would be serious repercussions for all of the workers. He pleaded with the men to open the line.^{12/} Another officer told the men that they must have a legal strike and asked them to open the lines and go back to work and that a legal strike would be called when this was possible. The local newspaper reported that the response that the union officers received from the pickets at this point was extremely hostile. One of the picketers was reported as saying: "We're fed up with you, we don't want you," to the union president. The antagonism toward the local union officers was so intense that the president left the scene in tears.^{13/}

By the morning of August 4, the situation was that all of the company's operations were effectively closed.

Summary of the Initiation of the Wildcat Strike

The manifest or observable actions associated with the initiation of the strike followed a simple pattern in the following time-process sequence:

1. It was reported to a group of men in one department during the lunch break of the afternoon shift on August 3, 1966, that their supervisor had allegedly questioned their courage to engage in a wildcat strike.
2. Shortly after the lunch break, at approximately 9:00 p.m., the cranes in the department all pulled to their stopping positions. The men then left their assignments and when they were ordered back to work by their supervisors they refused. About 35 - 40 men gathered on the shop floor; twenty of these walked out. In the change house they refused to listen to the union steward who urged them to go through normal procedure with respect to any grievances they might have. This group of men then visited other departments in the plant to attempt to recruit more supporters - this effort proved to be unsuccessful.
3. As the group of "initiators" formed a picket line at one of the plant's four gates other picketers appeared at the three other gates. Some of these were union stewards who had left the meeting still in progress at the Union Hall. Presumably, news of the beginning of the walk-out was conveyed to the Union Hall as soon as the group had left the department. Thus, by the time the people originating the walk-out in the plant had changed from their work clothes to their street clothes and visited a number of other departments in pursuit of supporters, their outside supporters had arrived at the other gates outside the plant and had taken up their positions equipped with picket signs.

4. This small group of twenty men who walked out, plus their supporters from outside the plant, may be regarded as the initiating group. As the afternoon shift came off duty they were able to "persuade" some more of their fellow-workers to join them on the picket line. By various means this group then were able to prevent more than 3,000 men reporting for the night shift.
5. "Delegations" were organized to visit departments which were still functioning, and other plants in the area belonging to the company, to bring them out on strike as well. This involved some of the picketers in trespass of company property, assault on at least one supervisor, and a small measure of sabotage.
6. "Vigilantes" were organized to prevent the company getting personnel into the plant by water. These groups of men from the original pickets patrolled landing docks and prevented any further transportation of key company personnel by this method.
7. During the night, the union called upon a number of their shop stewards to go to the gates and attempt to persuade the picketers to return to work. The union stewards were rebuffed. Early in the morning union officers came to the gates and exhorted the men to open the line to allow the day shift men to go to work. The union officers were howled down and insulted. At one point a group of men started to physically charge the union officers. A police escort was required to get the union officers out of the situation safely.
8. The incident involving the union officers was associated with an attempt to get the morning shift through the lines. This failed. Many workers who had come to go to work joined the picket lines which by this point had grown to approximately 3,000 men. The remainder went home.
9. When salaried personnel came to work in the morning during the hours of 7:00 - 9:00 a.m., they were prohibited from entering company property by the mass pickets.
10. Thus, within a period of twelve hours from the original incident, involving a walk-out of twenty workers in one department, all of Lake

Steel Company's operations had been closed by mass pickets; union leaders had been defied; and over 11,000 workers were absent from their work places.

This summary does not take into account a variety of machinations by a number of persons and groups in the period preceding the walk-out. This is documented and analyzed below. It does, however, document the initiation and spread of the wildcat strike and indicates that this process was completed within a 12-hour period between 9:00 p.m. on August 3, 1966 and 9:00 a.m. on August 4, 1966.

The Initial Union Responses to the Wildcat Strike

Local union officers not only did not support the wildcat strikers, but, from the outset, worked diligently to attempt to bring the strike to an early end. The union role was clearly recognized by the company which stated in its report of the strike:

This illegal strike had not been sanctioned by the union and from the outset the union officials attempted to gain control of the situation and have the men return to work, but due to the problem of communicating to such a large number of pickets, they were not readily able to accomplish this.^{14/}

The union acted immediately the strike began. Their objective was to attempt to terminate the wildcat strike and to regain control and leadership of the members. To this end, they employed a number of strategies in the following sequence:

1. Union stewards were sent to the various picket lines to mix with their members, point out that the strike was illegal, and attempt to persuade the men to desist. This took place during the night of August 3-4, 1966. Considerable hostility was directed to all the union stewards as they attempted to perform this task. They failed in their objective.
2. Early on the morning of August 4, 1966, officers of the local union went to the main picket line and addressed the pickets by loudspeaker. They pointed out that the union could not support this illegal strike and pleaded with the men to open the picket lines and permit the day shift to go to work. The union officers received a very hostile reception and were forced to retreat under a threat of physical violence.
3. During the morning of August 4, 1966, the local union prepared a leaflet for general distribution to the membership.^{15/} This leaflet made the following points:
 - a. there was no authorized strike at the Lake Steel Company;
 - b. that the previous evening, a meeting of all stewards had endorsed an executive and negotiating committee recommendation that the men remain at work and that the Negotiating Committee continue to meet with the Conciliation Board until, as the Board had suggested, an agreement was reached or the time had run out;
 - c. that members' rights to work and have a say in the affairs of the union had been barred by the irresponsible action of a group of employees;
 - d. that the union could not endorse a wildcat strike;
 - e. that, by law, there could be no strike relief or welfare payments for members engaged in a wildcat strike;
 - f. that the strike was leaderless, directionless, and futile; and
 - g. that the men should return to work at their normal shifts.

This leaflet was distributed to those manning the pickets by union stewards. Due to the hostility which had been engendered against the local union, this proved to be a somewhat hazardous task. One union steward reported his experience as he tried to distribute these leaflets to his members:

I tried to hand out leaflets to them, telling them the strike was illegal and that they had to go back before a settlement could be reached. But they took the leaflets out of my hands and made a pile of them in the sand. Then they set them alight ... loud hooping and yelling, just like a load of ... indians.
16/

4. Recognizing that the consumption of alcoholic beverages was playing some part in the growth of violence on the picket lines, the union asked the police to close the taverns in the immediate vicinity of the plant.
5. The local union president and the area representative of the United Steelworkers of America hired time on a local radio station to answer phoned-in questions from strikers in an attempt to clarify the situation and regain control. This proved to be unsuccessful, partly due to the fact that the local president of the union adopted a rather curt manner in dealing with questions.
6. The area supervisor of the union made a statement to the press in another attempt to communicate the union's analysis of the situation to their members. In part he said:

This work stoppage is not authorized or sanctioned by the international union. It has been organized by an irresponsible group who have successfully prevented members of the union from playing their proper role as both workers and union members. These unauthorized picket lines should no longer be recognized or respected by any union member. I urge our stewards and members to take an active part in seeing that a return to work is effected immediately. You are asked to report for work on your usual shift and to work as

usual until an official decision of the union changes that position. Your union Negotiating Committee and Executive ask for your cooperation and support in effecting an orderly return to work. Your Negotiating Committee cannot proceed with negotiations under these circumstances. Therefore, this unauthorized work stoppage is detrimental both to you and to your union. Please cooperate by returning to work.17/

7. The National Director of the union issued a statement from his office in the provincial capital declaring the strike as unjustified and asking the workers to return to work:

I urge the striking members of Local 08 to support the officers they have elected and to abide by the proper processes of the union. Those who bypass the union's democratic processes are not only aiding the reactionaries in society, but they are damaging their union and endangering the whole collective bargaining process. When the strike began a full report of conciliation talks were being given to the local stewards. The report emphasized that negotiating committees were determined to win contracts in line with the union policy that Canadian steelworkers were entitled to a superior reward for their superior productivity. A specific and reasonable deadline was set and there is a regular membership meeting within a few days. That is the proper time and the right place for membership decisions. The present rash of wild-cat strikes in Canada is understandable, but it is unfair to tens of thousands of workers and their wives and their children and must stop. The labour movement has continuously pointed out that our compulsory conciliation laws do not conciliate, but merely irritate and inflame. I am also sure that recent months have taught a lesson to those who claim that union members are only dissatisfied because they are told to be dissatisfied by their leaders.

I hope that recent months have convinced the legislature to change foolish and outdated laws. But all the indifferent politicians and unfair employers in the country do not

justify union members harming the democratic processes of their own union movement. When minorities bypass machinery, they not only endanger that machinery, but they are unfair to thousands and thousands of their fellow members and wives and children of those members who must have the right to make their own decisions about their own welfare in an orderly and dependable manner.18/

The Initial Company Response to the Wildcat Strike

As the strike got under way, the company's major pre-occupation and concern was with achieving an orderly shut-down of the various processes involved in their operations. There was great anxiety with respect to the blast furnaces as a failure to bank these units would have resulted in extensive damage. The company called in their off-duty supervisory personnel to help them in this task. Only a few managed to get through the picket lines. A larger number were brought into the plant by boat during the night of August 3-4, 1966, before the pickets realized that this method of access to the plant was being utilized. The company managed to assemble approximately 400 of their supervisory personnel and succeeded in banking and closing the giant blast furnaces.19/

The second major concern of the company was for adequate police protection to prevent violence among the pickets. The chairman of the board of the Lake Steel Company met with the mayor and controller of Lake City on the morning of August 4, 1966. The chairman of the board was quoted as stating: "I have asked the mayor to see that law and order are maintained."20/ It was also reported in Lake City News that earlier in the

morning the mayor had talked with the president of Lake Steel Company and the assistant police chief. The mayor reported that the president of the company "was concerned that there be adequate police on hand to prevent any violence or unfortunate incidents at the plant."21/

The Response of the Conciliation Board

The chairman of the Conciliation Board, which was still meeting with company and union negotiators in the provincial capital, announced on the morning of August 4, 1966 that the conciliation process was being suspended due to the illegal strike. He stated:

The Board has no intentions of resuming negotiations until the picket line is removed and the employees have returned to work. It is the unanimous view of the Board that the law prohibiting strikes during conciliation proceedings must be upheld. The unwarranted conduct of irresponsible elements acting contrary to the law and against the specific instructions of their elected leaders and bargaining representatives cannot be tolerated.22/

Overt Action of the Strikers During the Interim Period of the Wildcat Strike

The first full day of the wildcat strike at Lake Steel Company was August 4, 1966. The pattern of behaviour of the workers on this day was characterized by:

1. continued effective mass picketing;
2. the growth of anti-police sentiments in response to attempts by police to open the picket lines;

3. the growth of anti-news media sentiments directed particularly toward news photographers attempting to photograph "incidents"; and
4. the outbreak of vandalism involving the breaking of car windows and slashing tires of cars parked in the company lot. Presumably, these cars were identified by the strikers as being the property of supervisory staff and other workers who were still working in the plant.

While the mass picketing of the company property persisted throughout August 4, most of the overt hostile behaviour was associated with the attempts of the local union officers to get the men to open the picket lines to allow the day shift to go to work in the morning. The rest of the day was relatively quiet. One news photographer was deprived of his equipment despite the attempts of police to protect him. As a result of this and other incidents, several picketers were arrested for various offenses ranging from creating a disturbance to assaulting a police officer.23/

During the night of August 4-5, 1966 a group of strikers overturned and burned two cars in the company parking lot. A number of other cars had their tires slashed and windows broken.24/ One of the participants indicated the motivations of the group who were engaging in this vandalism in these terms: "those guys who own those cars are scabs, they are getting paid double time, twenty-four hours a day to stay in there".25/ Two acts by the company precipitated picket line incidents on August 5, 1966. One of these was police action to clear a path through the picket lines at the plant's main gate to permit supervisory and office personnel to enter the plant. Approx-

imately 150 staff employees were escorted into the plant during the day. This process precipitated a large measure of hostility toward the police by many of the workers on the picket line. The outcome was that six of the strikers were arrested.26/

The second company act was an attempt to force a train of scrap steel through the picket line. The police formed a human barrier on each side of the railway track to allow the train to come forward through the picket line. As the train came up the track, approximately 200 of the strikers rushed the police lines, broke through them, and formed a solid barrier with their bodies over the track. The train was ordered to back away by company officials and did so. During the day a total of 29 strikers were arrested.27/

One company official was reported as admitting that the company did not require the trainload of scrap and that they were only trying to "prove the point" that there should be free access to the plant.28/

The union's National Director of Public Relations, who was located in Lake City by this time, described the company's attempt to force the train through the picket line as "appalling and foolish incident at the most inopportune time."29/ He claimed that the incident was an attempt by the company to assert its authority and had no practical purpose. He stated: "management has the habit of trying to establish its authority, in principle, at the most inopportune times".30/ This union spokesman's greatest concern was that the incidents

of this day, precipitated by company decisions, could perhaps destroy the growing communication that was developing between the union officers and the strikers.

The company report indicates that the arrests made on August 5, 1966 made a total of 33 for the preceding two days.31/ As it turned out, this was the day on which violence reached its peak during the strike. The incidents on August 5, 1966 were primarily the responses of strikers to the company's two attempts to assert their authority. These were the basis of the numerous clashes with police and the only other incidents that occurred that day resulted from a series of sit-downs by strikers on the highway leading to the plant.

Through the night of August 5-6, 1966, only scattered incidents were reported. The numbers of people manning the pickets were somewhat reduced. The company felt that the large number of police now on hand were exercising more control over the "mob", and that, therefore, many of the strikers lost interest in the picket lines.32/

By the morning of August 7, 1966 there were considerably fewer picketers than previously at the gates. Later in the morning most of these left to attend a union rally and meeting which had been scheduled to be held in the Civic Stadium at 10:30 a.m. that morning. At this point approximately 50 of the strikers' wives manned the picket line.33/ At the termination of the union meeting the strikers voted to return to work and immediately after the meeting all pickets were withdrawn from all company plant entrances.

The Union's Secondary Responses to the Strike

It has been shown above that the union's initial response was to mobilize union officers and stewards in a direct confrontation with the strikers in an attempt to get them to return to work. It has also been noted that the union attempted to persuade workers to ignore the picket lines through distribution of a leaflet declaring the strike to be illegal and pointing out that it was being conducted by an irresponsible group. Both of these efforts of the union to discredit the striking group failed. The local union officers and the Negotiating Committee failed in their attempts to challenge the dissidents in the union group.

At this point, the union attempted to regain control of the situation by employing a different strategy. They invited each of the four gates at the plant to send three representatives to come and meet the Negotiating Committee to discuss the situation. However, instead of twelve representatives going to the Union Hall on the evening of August 5, 1966, between two and three hundred of the strikers converged on the union hall.^{34/} There was considerable confusion there and the situation was not simplified by the arrival of a contingent of police, presumably called by local union officers. It was reported that some strikers attempted to break up the meeting. Others directed their hostility toward the police. One of the strikers verbalized this hostility in these terms: "Get the fuzz out of here. This is our hall. They have no right here!"^{35/} Eventually fourteen or so of the men were delegated to

meet privately with the Negotiating Committee to discuss the situation. Before the meeting at the union hall terminated workers who had been jailed earlier in the day and released on bail turned up and created something of a disturbance by demanding that the union see to it that charges against them were dropped. They were also most anxious to get some assurance that the union would see that the company made no reprisals against them. In the absence of such assurance, they threatened to disrupt any membership rally which the union proposed be held.^{36/} The representatives of the strikers accepted this position as one of their major proposals. The others were a demand that a contract be negotiated within seven days of any return to work and that a membership rally be held very soon.

On August 6, 1966 the local union announced details of the rally to be held the following morning.

The Company's Secondary Response to the Strike

On the basis of the evidence available, it is fairly clear that as soon as the company had looked after its equipment, it turned its attention toward attempting to reassert its authority.

On the morning of August 5, 1966, two actions occurred which can only be interpreted as emanating from direct company policy. First of all, a maximum number of police were put on duty at the main gates of the plant. The police then, over a period of some hours, cleared and attempted to maintain a path

through the pickets for the entrance of office and supervisory personnel. It is also reasonable to infer that the office and supervisory personnel must have been acting under direct orders from the company to report for work under some kind of guarantee that the police would provide safe escort into and out of the company property.

This tactic did succeed in getting some 150 staff employees into the plant. But, if the objective was to break the picket line, the company failed. The action of the police gave rise to numerous clashes between police and strikers and resulted in a number of arrests being made. The net effect of this operation was the development of increased overt hostility to the police and the company. The company, apparently, failed to realize that incidents between the police and strikers are almost certain to raise the level of hostility amongst the members of a group of this type.

The second company action was an attempt to move a trainload of scrap steel across the picket lines and into the plant. This action took place on the same day - August 5, 1966. On the basis of the evidence, this action also must be regarded as an attempt by the company to assert its authority. Although some company officials were reported in the press as saying that they had no knowledge of the train, this statement was contradicted by other company officials who stated that the company did not need the scrap and that they were only "trying to prove the point that there should be free access to the plant".37/

This latter statement is more in accord with the observable facts. Prior to the train moving up, police formed a barrier on each side of the rail tracks. As the train approached, several hundred strikers charged police lines and swarmed all over the railway track. In this situation the train was ordered to backup by company officials.

There can be little doubt that both of these actions were designed by the company in an attempt to reassert its authority, break up the picket lines, and establish free access to company premises. In all of these objectives the company failed. The unintended result of their actions was to heighten the level of hostility and to make the local union's efforts to regain control of the situation more difficult. The experience of seeing fellow strikers "manhandled" by police, shoved into paddy-wagons, and taken to jail only succeeded in raising the level of hostility among the other strikers. As it turned out, the arrests stemming from these company actions proved to be a stumbling block to settlement and a rallying issue for dissidents within the local union.

The Local Union Regains Control

The union membership rally was held in the local football stadium on the morning of August 7, 1966. The union Negotiating Committee and local officers were greeted with some hostility when they appeared to begin the meeting. This response was reported to come from a minority of the assembled

members. At the meeting the Union Negotiating Committee and local officers urged the men to return to work and promised that if the union and company could not agree on a new contract then a legal strike could be called by the union seven days after the Conciliation Board had made its report. It was also pointed out that the Conciliation Board would continue in recess until the men returned to work.

Some questions were directed to the officers with respect to what the union was doing for the strikers who had been arrested on the picket lines. These questions were evaded by the union officers. The president of the local union stated afterwards to newspaper reporters that some of those arrested in connection with the various incidents were not members of the local union; indeed, some of them were not even members of the steelworkers' union.38/

At the end of a two-hour meeting the workers voted by secret ballot on the question of whether they would resume work or not. Through arrangements with the mayor of Lake City, employees of the city clerk's department supervised and counted the ballots. The balloting resulted as follows:

(1) for a return to work. 4,319

(2) for continuing the strike. 1,142

It was reported that several hundred of those attending the meeting left without casting their ballots.

Table 1 shows that almost half of the membership of Local 08 (45.61%) did not attend the meeting at which the

decision was made with respect to a resumption of work. The total number of members attending was 5,711 and approximately 250 of those in attendance did not vote on the issue. Twenty per cent of those attending were in favour of continuing the wildcat strike. While those voting for a resumption of work constituted a large majority of those in attendance at the meeting (75.62%), they constituted a minority (41.13%) of the total membership of the local union. In view of the importance of the issue to be voted upon the large number of absences calls for some explanation. A union officer explained these absences as partly the result of the fact that many men were on vacation. Others had gone elsewhere to look for alternative employment.39/

The breakdown in Table 1 does indicate that one-tenth of the membership supported the wildcat strike and were in favour of continuing on this course.

Union officers let it be known, after the results of the ballot were announced, that they would cross any picket lines which were erected at the plant the following day. One union officer said that he was confident that the men would return to work, then enforce their decision in any confrontation with the rebel faction.40/

On the morning of August 8, 1966, the union's area supervisor along with officers of the local and members of the Negotiating Committee led the workers arriving for the morning shift into the plant without incident. There were no pickets at the gate; the wildcat strike was apparently over.

Table I. Membership Response to Ballot on the Question of a Resumption of work at Lake Steel Company, conducted on August 7, 1966.

		Per Cent of Attendance	Per Cent of Total Membership
Eligible membership in Local 08	10,500		(100.00)
Total attendance at meeting	5,711		(54.39)
Distribution of vote at meeting:			
For work resumption	4,319	(75.62)	(41.13)
Against work resumption	1,142	(20.00)	(10.87)
Present but not voting (estimated)	250	(4.38)	(2.38)
Total	5,711		
Membership not in attend- ance at meeting	4,789		(45.61)
Membership not in attend- ance at meeting <u>OR</u> not voting	5,039		(47.99)

THE RESUMPTION OF WORK

The Company's Application of Discipline

Work was resumed at the Lake Steel Company without incident at 7:00 a.m. on August 8, 1966. The unruffled calm, however, did not last for long. The company announced that morning that 35 employees were being discharged and a further 16 employees suspended. The Lake Steel Company spokesman who announced this disciplinary action would not say more than that certain employees had been classified as "undesirable".^{41/} A union spokesman said that there appeared to be "a growing similarity" between the list of those to be disciplined and the list of men arrested by the police during the four-day wildcat strike.^{42/}

The impact of these dismissals and suspensions on workers in the plant was considerable. Within a short period another potential wildcat strike was in the making. The situation in one of the craft shops in the plant was described to me by the chief union steward there in these terms:

There were about 80 men on shift on the morning of August 8. One man in the shop - who had been arrested on the picket line - came into the shop, changed his clothes, and started to work. He was called into the foreman's office immediately along with myself. The foreman then took us both to the superintendent's office. I was asked to wait outside and the worker was then called into the office and told that he was discharged forthwith as an undesirable. I returned to the shop and told three or four men that the worker in question had been fired. Within three minutes this information had spread right down the shop. There was a very strange reaction. The men stopped work and began to congregate in the centre aisle of the shop. They just stood there! I felt that they were getting ready to walk out again. I asked for permission to hold a shop meeting and this was granted. I then got in touch with the union and they told me to try and hold the men in the plant so that we could proceed with negotiations. I then called the men together and talked to them. I tried to use reason to get them to stay in - even though my own emotions were telling me to pull them out - we have a solid group in our department and they eventually responded to common sense. The men responded to my plea - but they were not very happy about it. I am still not sure that I was right in what I did.43/

This kind of scene was replicated all over the plant that morning. Union stewards, acting on the advice of their officers, worked very hard to try and keep the men from walking out. The stewards called upon the union for some kind of assistance to help them persuade the men to stay on the job. The union responded by calling all of those who had been dismissed to come to the union office immediately. At the union office they were interviewed and advised by the union area supervisor. The end result of these encounters was that 27 of

those who had been disciplined signed a statement asking their fellow-workers to stay on the job. This statement was reproduced immediately by the local union - including the actual signatures of the 27 men - and sent to the plant for general distribution.44/ Many stewards stated that this leaflet helped them greatly in their attempts to prevent another walkout.

Later, a company officer was asked why the company had taken the decision to discipline these men on the first day of the resumption of work following the wildcat strike. He stated that at first the company intended to discipline every person that they could identify on photographs that they had of the picket lines.45/ He showed me a large number of photographs which had been taken from inside the plant gates by the use of a telephoto lens and then enlarged. Many of the persons in these photographs had a circle drawn around their heads and a number was at the side of each head. The reverse side of the photographs identified many of the persons shown on the front. Presumably, the photographs had been presented to the supervisory staff for purposes of identification.

The company officer stated that later they revised their earlier decision and decided to discipline only those who had been arrested by the police. This officer was asked if he felt that this was a wise decision to apply at that particular time. He stated:

We have always taken a strong position on uprisings - this seems to have kept things dampened down in the past.

We anticipated trouble over the application of discipline, but we felt that we had to treat people who had participated directly; that we had to deal with them immediately. We could not allow them to come into the plant. We informed the union in advance and gave them a list of those who were going to be disciplined. The only immediate response from the union was that they asked us if we knew what we were doing. The union filed grievances for those who had been disciplined, but they found themselves in an awkward position in that they could not raise the disciplinary issue in a direct way in the negotiations.46/

It is almost certain that the company's action with respect to discipline on the morning of August 8, 1966, would have precipitated a further wildcat strike if the union had not acted with such great imagination and speed. First of all, the union mobilized all their shop stewards in the plant to talk the men out of another wildcat. Secondly, the union showed great ingenuity in getting a message to the workers, signed by a majority of those who had been disciplined, asking them to stay at work. The speed with which this document was reproduced and distributed was an important factor here. This was largely the result of the fact that this local union has a printing unit of its own of a type not often found in a local union. In the absence of either of these factors, another wildcat strike would probably have been under way by midday of August 8, 1966.

The Resumption of Negotiations

The negotiation-conciliation process was resumed in the provincial capital on August 9, 1966. Newspaper reports

emphasized that the fate of the 51 discharged men was likely to become an issue in these talks. One union official said that it was almost "automatic" that the company's actions in this area would be considered. The union's area supervisor said that grievances concerning the penalized employees would be considered. He said Lake Steel Company officials had maintained earlier that all outstanding grievances at the time of settlement be resolved.

The Union's official attitude was enunciated in a leaflet which they distributed on August 10, 1966. This leaflet announced the resumption of negotiations and went on to state:

In spite of our resentment of the company's disciplinary action and the attitude of some foremen since the return to work, Judge C has stated that the Board will consider the dispute only if we remain at work.47/

This leaflet went on to announce arrangements that had been made by the union to help disciplined employees find temporary jobs. It stated that, by law, the union could not contribute to their financial support and stated "these members have in no way severed their connections with Lake Steel Company, and our union is doing everything possible to assist them".48/

Meetings between union and company negotiators lasted for nine hours on the first day of negotiations following the strike. The chairman of the Conciliation Board said that negotiations had resumed in "a promising atmosphere".49/ He stated that the parties had headed right into the major issues and

were having fruitful discussions and that negotiations would continue until some definite offer could be made for the employees.50/

The chairman of the Conciliation Board made a further statement on August 12, 1966, in which he stated that he hoped a settlement could be worked out over the next two days.51/

About this time, the local union issued another leaflet designed to scotch rumours and misrepresentation of what was happening in the talks with the Conciliation Board.52/

On August 17, 1966, newspapers reported that negotiations had reached the final phase and that an agreement was expected to be completed that day for submission to a mass meeting of the membership that night. In the leaflet of August 10, 1966, the union had cancelled a regular membership meeting and re-scheduled it for August 17, 1966.

An agreement was concluded between the union Negotiating Committee and the company on August 17, 1966, and that evening the union officers went before their membership to present details of the agreement and to recommend acceptance. A similar meeting for night-shift workers was held the following day. The meeting on the evening of August 17, 1966, was attended by about 4,000 union members. The president of the local union was hooted and jeered by some of those in attendance as he outlined the details of the agreement. He urged members to accept the contract and said that targets of the

union's Negotiating Committee had been reached. He announced basic wage increases of 28 cents an hour spread over a three-year contract. These basic increases were to be applied as follows:

1. Ten cents effective August 1, 1966;
2. Eight cents effective August 1, 1967; and
3. Ten cents effective August 1, 1968.

The president pointed out that these increases would bring wages to one cent an hour higher than equivalent jobs in the United States steel industry by August 1967. He also announced substantial improvements in the pension plan.

Arrangements were made for members to be balloted on acceptance of the contract on August 22, 1967. The issue with which the ballot was concerned was posed in the following form:

CONTRACT REFERENDUM
VOTE

LOCAL 08

"Are you in favour of accepting the Negotiating Committee recommendation to accept the contract?"	YES	
	NO	

Rejection of the Contract Offer by Ballot

Balloting on the company offer was conducted at all plant gates and in the Union Hall over an 18-hour period on

August 22, 1966. Much to the surprise of both company and union officials, the ballot indicated that a majority of the members voting were against accepting the contract offer. A total of 8,431 members voted; this represented 80.30 per cent of the total membership of 10,500. Of those voting, 3,937 (46.70%) were for accepting the contract and 4,494 (53.30%) were against accepting the contract.

Background to the Rejection of the Contract Offer
in the First Ballot of the Membership

To understand the rejection of the contract offer it is necessary to go back to the membership meeting held on the evening of August 17, 1966 - five days prior to the ballot being taken. At this meeting, the Negotiating Committee reported and then the meeting was promptly adjourned despite the fact that a number of members wished to be heard on the issues. These members had gone forward to the microphones to indicate that they had statements to make, but they were not given the opportunity to do so. There was some disorder following the adjournment of the meeting on this issue. About 15 to 20 people were involved in this incident. Presumably, the local union officers and Negotiating Committee recognized those who wanted to address the meeting as members of a dissident faction and they acted to prevent them being given the opportunity of addressing the membership. Two days after the membership meeting, on August 19, 1966, the local union distributed a special 8-page edition of the union newspaper to their members.

Table II. Ballot on the First Contract Offer at Lake Steel Company - August 22, 1966

		Per Cent of Those Voting	Per Cent of Total Membership
Total number of members	10,500		(100.00)
<u>Voting Returns:</u>			
For acceptance of the contract	3,937	(46.70)	(37.50)
Against acceptance of the contract	4,494	(53.30)	(42.80)
Total Voting	8,431	(100.00)	(80.30)
Total number of members not voting	2,069		(19.70)

This outlined the terms of the new contract proposals and indicated that the Negotiating Committee unanimously recommended acceptance of the company proposal.

The latest situation with respect to those employees who had been discharged or suspended by the company during the strike was outlined in a "box" on page 6 of the union newspaper in the following terms:

Company Forced to Review Disciplinary Action

Twenty-seven of the members who were disciplined by the company signed a leaflet which was issued on Monday, August 8, the day we returned to work. We are all deeply indebted to these men who demonstrated their confidence in our Negotiating Committee and Executive by this action. That this confidence was justified is demonstrated by the agreement reached under the chairmanship of Judge C, who has agreed to conduct the final, judicial, review of these cases.

Here is what the union secured in the Negotiations. The company commits itself to the chairman of the Conciliation Board, his Honour Judge C, with respect to the recent unlawful strike as follows:

- (1) no civil action will be taken against the local or international union;
- (2) the company will waive the vacation penalties which would otherwise be applicable under the agreement with respect to employees who have not been disciplined;
- (3) the company will undertake to review all disciplinary action imposed on an individual basis and will be prepared to discuss and review its decision with the Grievance Committee. Such review with respect to individuals who have not been charged will take place immediately. In consideration of such review, it is understood that all grievances filed in connection with such discipline are withdrawn on the understanding that if the union is dissatisfied with the company's decision in respect of any individual case, the matter may be referred by the union to his honour Judge C who shall act as mediator.

The day prior to the ballot, August 21, 1966, members of a dissident faction in the union distributed a printed leaflet to workers at the plant gates calling upon them to reject

the proposed contract. The main thrust of the leaflet was that if members accepted the contract they would be doing so in exchange for the livelihoods of 51 of their fellow workers. Some contract items were also listed as inadequate, but the primary appeal of the leaflet was based upon dissatisfaction with the Negotiating Committee's agreement with the company on the disposition of the 51 discipline cases.53/

A wire service news story claimed that the company reprisals against arrested strikers, and the attitude of the union to this, was the cause of the rejection of the company offer. In part, this report stated:

A key factor in the rejection appeared to be union members' discontent with the treatment of 51 men disciplined by the company after a recent five-day wildcat walkout.54/

An informant, an officer of the local union, analyzed the situation at the time in these terms:

Right about now the situation has blown right up in the air again, the proposed contract has been rejected by a 53% to 47% vote. The apparent reason is the disposition of the 51 dismissal cases, with the situation on incentives and the lack of any additional vacation or statutory holiday pay thrown in. There is also some discontent with the length of the proposed agreement, three years seems to be too long.55/

The dissident faction in the union probably played some part in mobilizing a majority of those voting to reject the contract, on the basis that acceptance would mean sacrificing the jobs and livelihoods of the 51 disciplined workers.

Immediately following the rejection of the contract offer on August 22, 1966, the union executive and Negotiating Committee communicated with the provincial Minister of Labour requesting that he release the report of the Conciliation Board. This was done so that the union would be in a legal position to call a strike, if necessary, to resolve the dispute. This information was conveyed to the union membership in a leaflet issued on August 23, 1966. This leaflet also advised the membership that the Negotiating Committee and the Executive were making the necessary preparations to conduct a strike vote.56/

The Second Ballot

Between August 23 and August 28, 1966, the union and company negotiators discussed the situation further. The outcome of these discussions was that the company offered an additional three cent per hour for the first year of the proposed contract. Some seniority difficulties were resolved and it was also agreed that the company would review all discipline cases not later than September 30, 1966. With these improvements on the last offer, the Negotiating Committee and Executive Committee of the union set up a new ballot for August 30, 1966. One of the basic distinctions between this ballot and the former one was that this one specifically stated that rejection of the offer would be regarded as authorization to call a strike on September 3, 1966 at 7:00 a.m. Thus, the issue now was not simply acceptance or rejection of the offer as in the first ballot, but acceptance of the offer or strike within a few days.

The union distributed a leaflet conveying this information, in some detail, to the membership.^{57/} This prompted the dissident group to frenetic activity. They quickly convened a meeting in, of all places, the union hall. They accused the union officers of being dictatorial in the methods they had used to inform the membership of the new proposals. The basic position of the rump group, apparently, was that they did not want an offer to be put to the membership until the 51 disciplined men had been reinstated. They strongly resented the fact that the union administration had separated the issues of the contract offer and the disciplined men and was dealing with them separately. The rump group were squarely on the horns of a dilemma. To keep the two issues intertwined their only course appeared to be to attempt to prevent the ballot taking place.

Since the rump meeting was held in the union hall, the union administration officers were able to obtain a stenographer's record of the whole proceedings. On this basis, the administration became acquainted with the rump group's strategy and were able to take measures to counter their efforts. The first counter-measure was for the administration to distribute a second leaflet that day advising the membership that an unconstitutional meeting of a rump group had been held and that this group had decided:

1. that the ballot be boycotted in some fashion;
2. to issue a leaflet into the plant; and

3. to take up a petition calling for the resignation of the union executive.

The union administration pointed out in their leaflet that the rump group represented a minority and that they were attempting to deny the majority their right to a vote on the company's latest offer.58/

The leaflet which the rump group distributed again pleaded the case of the 51 disciplined men. Although it did not specifically call for a rejection of the company offer this was implied. The slogan at the bottom of the leaflet asked: "Can you sell these 51 brothers for three cents?"59/ The reason for the lack of a clear appeal to the members to reject the offer was probably due to the fact that the rump group felt that they could prevent the ballot from being held. Apparently, they felt that they had sufficient sympathizers among the tellers in the voting tents that they could call upon these men to walk out on their responsibilities and thus prevent the ballot from being administered.

The union administration countered this strategy by drafting 17 extra tellers into the voting stations so that if any tellers walked off the job there would still be sufficient available to administer the ballot. The end result was that no tellers left their stations, the ballot was administered, and any sympathizers of the rump group that were among the tellers were present during the administration and counting of the ballot, leaving no grounds for the rump group claiming a "fixed" count on the ballot.

Members Vote to Accept Contract

The vote on the new contract offer was conducted at the plant gates and in the union hall over an 18-hour period on August 30, 1966. The count began as soon as the voting was over and was administered by a team of 56 tellers and scrutineers. The count was completed by 2:00 a.m. on the morning of August 31, 1966.

Table III. Ballot on the Improved Contract Offer at Lake Steel Company - August 30, 1966.

		Per Cent of Those Voting	Per Cent of Total Membership
Total number of members	10,500		(100.00)
<u>Voting Returns:</u>			
For acceptance of the contract	5,702	(63.75)	(54.30)
Against acceptance of the contract	3,242	(36.25)	(30.88)
Total Voting	8,944	(100.00)	(85.18)
Total number of members not voting	1,556		(14.82)

The detailed results of the ballot are shown in Table III. This shows that 85.18 per cent of the total membership participated in the vote - 8,944 out of an eligible

membership of 10,500. This was a high level of participation for the local membership. Of those voting, 5,702 (63.75%) voted in favour of accepting the contract while 3,242 (36.25%) were in favour of rejecting the company offer and engaging in a legal strike beginning as of September 3, 1966.

While the proportion in favour of accepting the union's recommendation and the company offer was decisive, the proportion voting against the union's recommendation and in favour of a strike has to be regarded as substantial. Since the whole basis of the rump group's appeal was with respect to the situation of the disciplined men, and the contract offer was a relatively good one, there is indication here of substantial membership dissatisfaction, at least, with the union administration's handling of the discipline cases.

The Cost of the Strike

Since Lake Steel has a 3-shift, 24-hour operation, the four-day wildcat strike resulted in direct losses that can be estimated at approximately \$6 million. Based on a sales estimate of \$1¼ million a day, the company lost approximately \$5 million. The workers involved lost approximately \$180,000 a day in wages, for a total of \$720,000 for the duration of the strike.60/

These figures do not take into account direct costs to the company in terms of overtime payments to supervisory personnel and staff. Another indirect cost to the community was payment that had to be made for considerable extra police services.

IV

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ERUPTION OF THE WILDCAT STRIKE AT THE LAKE STEEL COMPANY

The theory and frame of reference utilized for the analysis of this wildcat strike is based on the scheme provided by Smelser.61/ This implies an acceptance of the position that the phenomenon comes under the general category of "collective behaviour". Furthermore, within his scheme of analysis, a wildcat strike belongs to the sub-category identified as the "hostile outburst". This is regarded as an elementary form of collective behaviour.62/ One of the main concerns of Smelser's scheme is the identification of elements of structural strain in the situation which, in part, explain the occurrence of the hostile outburst. As an elaboration of this element we are also concerned in this analysis with the identification of historical sources of strain. Thus, sources of strain will be identified which emanated from historical factors associated with the union, structural factors associated with the union, structural conditions in the plant, and influences which impinged on the situation from the wider society.

While these various sources of strain will be identified and delineated there is no scientific method available

which would permit differential weight to be accorded to each element of strain. The best that can be done in this direction is to make an assessment of the likely importance of each of the factors identified as sources of strain. The extent to which this assessment is based upon intimate knowledge of the historical and social context of the event enhances the degree of reliability that may be accorded to it. In the present case such knowledge was acquired from direct observation of the overt behaviour associated with the episode as it was occurring, interviewing of participants, utilization of knowledgeable informants, and the analysis of relevant documentation.

The Sources of Strain

1. Historically-Located Strain

The first factor for consideration under this rubric is the circumstances and conditions under which the previous collective agreement was settled. The contract that was then extant was due to expire in July 1964. Negotiations commenced in May of that year, but a contract was not achieved until December 15, 1964. Thus, the previous negotiation experience of the membership was a source of dissatisfaction with the performance of their Negotiating Committee. Another source of dissatisfaction with the union's performance was that the package that was eventually obtained amounted to 32 cents and this was regarded as low relative to other contracts that were being written at the same time. The greatest and most lasting

source of dissatisfaction, however, was related to the circumstances under which the contract was concluded. At a meeting of the union stewards on December 15, 1964, the president of the local reported on the company's latest offer and advised that the Negotiating Committee were recommending that the offer be rejected and that preparations be set in motion for the conduct of a strike against the company.

Between the time of this meeting and a general membership meeting that was held later that same evening, the National Director and District Director of the union entered the picture. These two officers, in private negotiations with the company, secured the offer of one additional cent and managed to persuade a majority of the Negotiating Committee that this was the best offer that could be obtained from the company and that its acceptance should be recommended to the membership.⁶³/ At the membership meeting the Negotiating Committee followed this course and made such a recommendation.

The situation was rather unusual in that the President of the local who was also chairman of the six-man Negotiating Committee reported that, as chairman, he was recommending acceptance of the contract; but went on to report that this recommendation was the result of a 4 to 2 vote on the committee and that he, personally, intended to vote against the recommendation of acceptance. When the vote was taken, he and one other member of the Negotiating Committee voted against acceptance of the offer.

This resulted in the generation of considerable dissension at the meeting. The content of the offer was a source of dissatisfaction. Furthermore, the intervention of the National Officers, though it was constitutional, was greatly resented by some of the membership. One member utilized the situation as the basis of making a plea for Canadian autonomy in union affairs and suggested that it might be necessary for the local union to break away from its parent international union.^{64/} This was one of the early overt acts that culminated in the later emergence of a "Canadian autonomy" faction within the local union. The relationship of this group to the wild-cat strike in 1966 is discussed below. Despite the dissension and dissatisfaction expressed at the membership meeting, when the offer was put to the total membership by ballot a few days later, it was accepted by a small majority. This acceptance, however, could hardly be described as enthusiastic. An incumbent officer of the local expressed the judgement that the membership had been very dissatisfied with the protracted nature of the negotiations and that the general attitude was that when it finally came it was a "mediocre settlement."^{65/}

A group of activists in the local union had also felt that the people from the national office had "put one across" the local membership by the manner in which the settlement was achieved. Some informal leaders in the plant were active in spreading this sentiment among the workers. One union officer said: "there was the feeling that we had been the victims of a few shady deals ('sweetheart contracts') on the part of the

union in the past and that this was another one".66/ The manner and results of the intervention by the national and district officers appears to have provided a basis for the growth of distrust of the formal union organization. There is no evidence that any kind of "sweetheart deal" was made, but the nature of the intervention appears to have provided a basis for ready acceptance among the workers of such a view of the situation. If there was such widespread dissatisfaction with the 1964 contract offer then the question arises of why the workers, or at least a majority of them, accepted it when it was put to the vote. One analyst of the situation has provided two reasons for this:

- (i) that it was only two weeks prior to Christmas and therefore, the least opportune time of the year for the men to engage in a strike; and
- (ii) that the membership rationalized that if after more than five months of negotiation this was the best that the union could do, then time was not likely to improve their achievements.67/

Thus, the general feeling of workers in the plant following the 1964 negotiations was a combination of disappointment, some desire for revenge against the company at a future date, and sentiments of distrust of the union officers. Some activists attempted to gain adherents by spreading the message that "next time there would be some real action".68/

The circumstances and outcome of the 1964 negotiations may be said to have generated certain attitudinal pre-dispositions among, at least, a proportion of the workers that

was available for dissident leaders to work with in the interim and for mobilization in the 1966 situation. This analysis is supported by a company officer's statement in 1966 that "we knew we could not protract negotiations as there was unrest in the local".69/ It is further supported by the content of many statements made by strikers during the 1966 wildcat strike. These were pointedly anti-union in character and were directed against union officers and members of the Negotiating Committee. Lake City News reported that in interviews that they conducted soon after the onset of the wildcat strike that "many of them declared angrily: 'the union's no good'".70/ One informant stated:

There are a lot of dissatisfied people here. Things were bound to come to a head. We're fed up with not getting decent contracts all along the line. What's the union been doing, that's what I want to know.71/

A clerical worker at the plant, who was not directly involved in the strike, was quoted as stating:

We knew this was coming. It had to come. There's been so much bad feeling and all of us have a great deal of sympathy for the wildcat strikers.72/

With reference to other interviews aimed at discovering the basis of discontent leading to the strike the local newspaper stated:

Chief among these (dissatisfactions) was the contention, expressed repeatedly by many strikers that any settlement would lead to a 'yellow-dog' or pro-company contract.

The yellow-dog theory dates back to the acceptance of the last contract by the Lake Steel workers.

In December 1964, 'Vote No' signs were chalked on many walls throughout the plant. Radical elements who felt the union executive was too gentle with the company waged a strong campaign for rejection of the new contract.

When the vote was taken, the contract was accepted by a less than a 10 per cent majority. The small majority left many workers embittered, feeling that they had been given short shrift by the union.

'It's the international (union) that causes the trouble,' one union member said. 'They couldn't give a damn about local 08 as long as they get the dues. 'We want action, not talk,' he said. 'Sure we elect the executive, and as soon as they are elected they think in terms of what is legal, not what is right. If we went along with the executive, the union would be an employees' social club run by the company'.73/

It would appear that a substantial measure of discontent existed in the plant emanating from the 1964 settlement. Furthermore, both management and union officers were aware of this fact. No one, of course, could predict the degree or intensity of this discontent and, over time, much of it probably became latent rather than overt. Nevertheless, latent hostilities can be regenerated within a crisis situation and there does seem to have been considerable latent hostility associated with the negotiation of the previous contract at the disposal of the leaders of the dissident factions within the plant. Both management and union officials were surprised that sufficient anti-union sentiment could be generated for the union leaders' return-to-work pleas to be ignored, and the union leaders themselves threatened

with physical violence when they appeared on the picket lines. 74/ These sentiments of distrust and hostility to the formal union leaders can only be explained in terms of the 1964 contract experience. This is not to ignore the fact that informal leaders in the plant were active in the fomentation of such sentiments. However, such activities are unlikely to have widespread success unless there is some concrete peg upon which to hang them. The 1964 settlement appears to have provided the necessary peg.

Contributing to this distrust of local union officers was an even older historical fact. This was the "defection" of the President of the local to the staff of Lake Steel Company in 1961. Union informants actually claimed that this man left the union and joined the labour relations staff of the company in the middle of negotiations for a new contract in 1962.75/ This was one of the factors that first helped to give the left-wing group access to the formal leadership offices to the union, although they fell just short of achieving a majority on the executive council in the elections following the negotiations in 1962. The man who was president of the local during the 1966 wildcat strike was first elected at this time as the leader of the left-wing slate. He led a left-wing slate again in 1964, but while he was personally elected, only three other members of his group succeeded in the elections. His own re-election was largely explicable in terms of his rejection of the 1964 contract offer.

A third historical factor that bears upon the situation is the fact that this local union had a history of factional political struggle. In any local union one can expect some degree of contest for the available positions of power. In a union the size of Local 08 (10,500 members) one can even expect the emergence of coalitions of one kind or another. But the lines of cleavage in this case had reached an unusually high degree of formalization. The factions within the union had crystallized into two main blocs by 1962. The incumbents in office, at the time, formed one group which was and is known as the "administration" or the "right-wing". A competing, militant group known as the "left-wing" emerged at this time and established itself along fairly formal organizational lines. This is also rather unusual in a local union. The left wing group adopted a constitution, held group meetings, and worked to get members of their group elected to offices within the union. In 1962, they organized and ran a slate of officers, as a group, in opposition to the incumbent right wing group. One of the planks of their campaign platform was the adoption of a much more militant approach to collective bargaining. They succeeded in ousting the incumbent President of the local at that time as well as getting other members of their slate elected to various offices. Since that time the local union has been an arena for the contest for power between these two groups. It is important to recognize that while these groups are known as the right and left wings of the union, this does not mean that they may be placed at the two polar points of a

standard ideological scale. Both groups would probably fall to the left-of-centre of such a scale. The right wing group do tend to be more cautious in their general approach to things; the left wing group tends to be more militant. The active membership of these groups has not proved to be a constant factor as members have, upon occasion, switched from one to the other. One constant political factor in the local is that any aspirant to union office has had to be associated with one or the other of these groups in order to get elected. In 1962, the left wing group gained a measure of control, at least in formal terms, by having members of their group elected to approximately half of the union Executive Committee. However, the formal success that they achieved at this time tended to become somewhat diluted in reality. As one of the leaders of the left wing group put it:

I just don't know what happens. We have gotten all kinds of people elected to office on our slate and as soon as they go upstairs (take up their seats on the executive) they seem to join the right wing. They behave just like the rest of them.

It would appear that some aspiring unionists are prepared to use the left wing group affiliation to obtain the electoral support that this provides to achieve union office; others who "switch" after they are elected may be simply responding to the obligations of the role that they have been elected to. It is one thing to be a non-office-holding member of the left wing group and quite another to be a member of the executive

involved in responsible decision-making. The outcome of this situation is that the left wing group tends to be strongly against a considerable portion of the incumbents in office whether they have previously supported them or not.

A new faction began to take shape among union members in 1964. It will be recalled that at the general membership meeting held on December 15, 1964, to discuss the contract, one man made a plea for the union breaking away from the international and becoming an autonomous Canadian union. This member had previously run for the office of President of the local and been badly defeated in the elections. In 1964 he began to gather a group of shop stewards and others together. This group embraced the philosophy of increased Canadian autonomy and thus took up a position of opposition to the International Union and its officers including the local's incumbent officers. They became known as the "CANTU" (Canadian Autonomy National Trade Union) group.

The autonomy group also appears to have an attachment to the Liberal political philosophy. A Liberal member of Parliament appears to have had a close connection with the autonomists. One informant stated: "This M.P. is the man behind the Liberal-Labour group, which is the nucleus of the C.A.N.T.U. in Lake City".^{76/} Further evidence for the likelihood of this connection is provided by an article which appeared in Lake City News on June 19, 1967. This article reported a speech in which this member of Parliament attacked the union's support of

the New Democratic Party. In view of the fact that Local 08 is heavily committed to the New Democratic Party, both in terms of financial and organizational support, the interest of this politician in seeing a change occurring in the local's leadership is understandable. One member of the autonomy group who was interviewed during the wildcat exhibited an almost pathological antagonism to the local's commitment to the New Democratic Party.

There is no direct evidence that the group had any formal association with the C.N.T.U., the French-Canadian trade union federation, although they did vociferously embrace the philosophy of increased Canadian autonomy in union affairs.

It should be noted that during this period the C.N.T.U. was heavily engaged in a struggle for membership with the unions affiliated with the Canadian Labour Congress, i.e., those unions that were predominantly international affiliates. Although this struggle manifested a number of forms, the tactic that was resented most by the international unions was the "raiding" of their already-organized locals. A considerable number of these raids were successful and resulted in some large blocs of workers switching from C.L.C. - affiliated unions to the C.N.T.U. However, most of these raids were located in the Province of Quebec where the appeal to "nationalism" elicited a favourable response from many French-Canadian workers.

The members of the autonomy group at Lake Steel expressed open and vocal support for the philosophy of the C.N.T.U. and it was upon this basis that the autonomy group came to be known within the plant as the CANTU group. Some rather spectacular bargaining successes by C.N.T.U. unions in the latter part of 1965 and early 1966 also provided a useful propaganda base for the autonomy group within the plant. However, there were few French-Canadians either in the group or working at Lake Steel so that formal relations between the group and the C.N.T.U. are not likely to have existed at this time. The existence of some kind of informal relationship is a possibility. This judgement is strengthened by the fact that in 1967 a prominent member of the autonomy group was appointed a full-time organizer for the C.N.T.U. and did become involved in organizational activities in competition with the United Steelworkers Union in the Lake City area.

In the preceding section the following sources of historically-located strain in Local 08 have been identified and elaborated:

- (i) the development of sentiments of distrust of both national and local union officers;
- (ii) the existence of sentiments of dissatisfaction with the local union's previous contract achievements; and
- (iii) the emergence and growth of two anti-administration factions within the local.

2. Strain Associated with Union Structure

There are two general kinds of strain emanating from the structure of the union itself:

- (a) strain emanating from the relationship between membership groups or factions and the local union administration (local union structure); and
- (b) strain emanating from the relationship between the membership, or factions thereof, local administration, and national-international administration (overall union structure).

While some of the factors to be discussed here have already been referred to in the previous section, this further discussion is necessary due to the fact that such factors operated upon the situation both as historical and structural sources of strain within the organization. While these two dimensions tend to converge in the actual process of the event it is useful to make an analytical distinction between them when they overlap, as structural analysis may help to explain their historical emergence.

(a) The Local Union Structure

Since Local 08 is an affiliate of the United Steelworkers of America its formal structure is determined, in broad outline and principle, by the constitution of the parent body. To give some understanding of the role of the two factions that developed, it is necessary to present a broad outline of the formal structure.77/

The Executive Committee of the Local is a twelve-man body which comprises the following offices or roles: President, Vice-President, Recording Secretary, Financial Secretary, Treasurer, Guide, Guard (2), Trustee (3), and Grievance Chairman. The position of highest status and prestige is, of course, that of the President and this is a full-time job for the man elected to that office. The ongoing activities of the Local are carried out by a number of committees. Executive officers are expected to attend committee meetings and report back to the full executive. The various offices in the local are filled by a plantwide election with the balloting being conducted at the various plant entrances as well as in the union hall. This is the formal structure that the two factions in the Local have responded to and attempted to "capture".

A number of factors combine to explain the fact that opposition to the administration takes the form of organized factions rather than individual approaches. The most important of these is the nature of the voting power distribution in the plant which is itself a function of the spatial distribution of the workers in the plant, the character of the labour force, and the system of steward representation.

First of all, the large work force of approximately 10,500 men is very widely distributed throughout thirty-one different departments which traverse a large geographical area. This is a basic factor operating to produce segmentation which is further compounded by the fact that the operation of the

plant is a seven-day, three-shift one. A majority of the employees work both rotating shifts and rotating days off. Adding to the segmentation is the fact that the allocation of shifts and off-time is operated on an individual rather than work group basis. Another factor is the diverse ethnic character of the work force. The plant is a basic steel operation which combines the possibility of relatively high earnings with a relatively low skill requirement. This has drawn large numbers of European immigrants to the plant as well as migrants from all over the United States and Canada.

All of these factors combine to produce a growing and highly-segmentalized work force with little potential for cohesion or collective action of any kind. It is this fact which makes the occurrence of a general wildcat strike throughout the plant a rather unusual phenomenon. While collective action has occurred in the plant in the past, it has either been a legal strike or a wildcat restricted to a particular work group or department.

A local union of the size of Local 08, confronted with the presence of such an array of elements of segmentation, is constantly faced with communication problems with respect to its membership. The vast bulk of the membership, in common with most other union groups, are largely inactive in union affairs. Their union participation and identification normally consists of paying their dues, which is inevitable under the check-off system, and having some degree of association with

their local shop steward whom they may have helped to elect and may listen to on union issues.

Each department in the plant elects its own stewards at regular intervals. The number of stewards in a mill or department is dependent upon the size of the work force in the unit on a ratio of approximately one steward for every thirty to forty men. Each department also has a chief steward and a number of assistant chief stewards. It is at this point in the local's political structure that we see the emergence of a kind of "brokerage system" which underlies and explains the factional form that opposition to the Local's administration takes.

Any successful candidate for the office of chief steward in a department must have the support of a group of shop stewards who, collectively, can deliver a majority of the department's membership vote in the election. The same principle applied for successful candidacy for departmental committees and the Executive Committee itself. To be successful in an election for the Executive Committee, of course, requires a coalition beyond the departmental level since the selections are conducted on the plant-wide basis.

Prior to 1962 the only available route to the Executive Committee, office in the various important committees, or election as a conference delegate was support of the individual's candidacy by the existing, office-holding group. The creation of the left wing group presented an alternative route

to office based upon the same principles of operation as the right wing incumbent group, i.e., the formation of a coalition of vote "brokers", who created a slate of candidates for the various offices. This arrangement provided a basis for the conduct of a unified campaign and creation of a potential electoral base through the combination of the various electorates.

With the emergence of the left wing group, the aspirant for office had a choice of two possible routes. However, the underlying principle of acceptance on either of the two slates remained the same: an aspirant for office had to develop considerable vote delivery potential to be acceptable to either of the factions. There has never been any formal obstacle to a union member running independently for office in the local, but the political reality was clear: the only possibility of election lay in the support of either of the two factions. It may be inferred that despite the emergence of the left wing group, many frustrated aspirants for office still permeated the active membership.

This may explain the basis of the appeal of the CANTU group. Its emergence offered another potential new route to office while at the same time it provided an alternative ideology of some potential appeal, namely the notion of increased Canadian autonomy which incorporated within its elements antagonism to both the local administration and the national and international leadership. It is understandable that these

combined elements of the CANTU ideology would gain adherents from the ranks of frustrated aspirants to office who had been hitherto blocked at the shop steward level of office-holding.

We may summarize here by stating that a basic and continuing source of strain in Local 08 emanated from the fact that there was always present a much larger number of aspirants for union office than there were offices available to be filled. The local union, from this point of view, may be regarded as being too large. Secondly, the highly segmented nature of the work force led to the development of a system of coalition, based upon vote "brokerage" as a basis for election to any office above the level of shop steward. This, in turn, led to the emergence of two opposition coalitions: the left wing group offering a more militant platform, and later, the CANTU group offering an alternative ideology based upon increased Canadian autonomy.

Since the objective of the two anti-administration factions in the Local was to gain control of the various elective offices, they engaged in a constant process of criticism of the efforts of the administration group. In this sense they operated as "disseminators of discontent".

(b) The Overall Union Structure

Two related themes emerged as indicators of dissatisfaction with the relationships between the local union, on the one hand, and its national and international offices

and their representatives, on the other. These two elements, which may be subsumed under the general theme of a felt dissatisfaction of the membership with the degree of autonomy exercised by the local union vis-à-vis the national and international office, were:

- (i) dissatisfaction with the performance of the union's area supervisor; and
- (ii) dissatisfaction with the extra-local union structure in general.

This general pattern of dissatisfaction with the extra-local union structure and the alleged subservience of the incumbent officers to the union hierarchy is one of the key factors in this analysis as it is inextricably tied in with the fact that the direction of hostility during the strike was almost exclusively against the union.

The Area Supervisor is appointed to office and is not elected by the locals that come under his general jurisdiction. The general response obtained from informants with respect to the man who occupied this office prior to, and during, the strike was that he had extended the powers of his office beyond what they ought to be. Informants saw this officer as not only dominating the local union officers, but also the local political machinery of the New Democratic Party. He occupied the role of chairman of the Constituency New Democratic Party. This confluence of union and political power was characterized by one informant this way: " A man cannot get elected to any kind of office in this community, never mind the union,

unless he (Area Supervisor of the union) gives his o.k." It is important to note that many of the signs carried by picketers during the strike identified this man and the Local President by name as the "enemy" that had to be removed. Personal observations confirmed that these two men acted in concert throughout the wildcat, with the Area Supervisor appearing to play the dominant role, even in public processes.

Tucker^{78/} has noted that this factor was not lost on the anti-administration factions or on the members in general. In commenting on the role of suspicion of the union's Executive Committee and the national and international office and how this increased during the strike he quotes an informant as stating:

Whenever you saw Solo (President of the Local) you saw Mack along (Area Union Supervisor)... it was obvious who was running the show. We knew where the strings were being pulled and we weren't having it.^{79/}

It is quite understandable that a union Area Supervisor will be involved in attempting to bring about a termination of a wildcat strike within his area of jurisdiction. In this case he was certainly operating under orders from the District and National Director with whom he was in constant communication. Their objective, of course, was to obtain a resumption of work so that the suspended negotiation process could be continued. However, the prominent public role that this Area Supervisor played in this case appears to have generated considerable

antagonism. He and the Local's President were joint targets for villification by a portion of the membership. The Local President was charged with being under the domination of the Area Supervisor and thus a tool of the International Office in the United States.

Acceptance of this definition of the situation by, at least, a segment of the membership was predicated upon the rather widespread distrust of the International Union's role dating back to the high-level intervention by District and National officers during the previous contract negotiations. The rationale offered for this intervention by opponents of the local administration, and widely disseminated in the plant, was that the International Office in Pittsburgh had ordered the Canadian officers to intervene and get a settlement at all costs and to avoid a strike so that the International's strike funds could be preserved for a possible strike that might come in the United States.

This issue of the distribution of funds between the Canadian segments of international unions and their parent bodies is a longstanding one and, whatever the facts may be in a particular case, there are widespread feelings among the rank and file membership that the Canadian segments do not receive equitable treatment in this regard. In fact, these kinds of sentiments and issues have been entertained in wider circles such as Canadian federal politics. This kind of concern was one of the factors behind the Canadian government passing

legislation in 1962 (Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act) which seeks, among other things, to establish the balance that exists on financial transactions between Canadian union members and their international head offices in the United States.80/

Whatever the facts may be, the feelings of dissatisfaction with head office (American) domination are real enough for a segment of the membership of Local 08 and these, of course, are regularly reinforced by the propaganda efforts of the autonomy group.

It will be seen later, when we discuss some of the consequences of the wildcat strike, that the question of the disposition and autonomy of strike funds was of sufficient importance to become a major issue between the factions as they fought to obtain delegate representation to the Canadian Policy Conference some time following the strike. Furthermore, the bulk of the delegates elected by plant-wide vote were members of the autonomy group and were committed to that conference to fight for a policy of an autonomous strike fund for Canadian members.

In the preceding section we have elaborated upon conditions giving rise to strain located within the structure of the union organization itself. These, in large part are integrated with the sources of strain already identified historically. In this section we have attempted to provide an analysis of the structural conditions which contribute to an explanation of their historical emergence.

3. Structural Strains in the Plant

Unusually strong forces of segmentation have already been identified based upon such factors as the spatial ecology of the plant and the ethnic nature of the work force. Another element working toward segmentation was the fact that the company tended to locate new employees in the new mills. This produced the clustering of newer, younger, low-seniority men in certain sectors of the industrial complex and the long-seniority, older employees in other sectors. Thus, there was a kind of inter-generational separation of the workforce. This is important in view of the ecological location of the original incident associated with the eruption of the wildcat strike. A factor of this kind, of course, has no relationship to the widespread acceptance and recognition of the wildcat by the workers throughout the plant, but it does have explanatory value in terms of suggesting one kind of flashpoint in a large industrial complex.

It appears that younger members of the workforce played a very active role in all aspects of this wildcat strike. The initial group who walked out of the plant and initiated the wildcat were all relatively young men. Another indication of the younger men's involvement is provided in Table IV which shows that the average age of 29 men arrested for activities on the picket lines was 28.6 years. The average age of all employees at Lake Steel Company is not known, but observations made as men changed shifts seemed to indicate that the company

Table IV. Age of Strikers Remanded by Court for Offences on the Picket Lines During Wildcat Strike at Lake Steel Company*

Offender	Age	Offender	Age
C.T.	30 Years	D.G.	41 Years
T.B.	35 "	L.H.	26 "
J.P.	23 "	D.M.	22 "
M.W.	32 "	S.S.	28 "
J.W.	28 "	A.R.	33 "
F.S.	42 "	T.B.	22 "
M.K.	37 "	P.W.	35 "
L.C.	21 "	I.U.	30 "
I.W.	28 "	L.M.	28 "
W.H.	30 "	Y.Z.	22 "
R.J.	35 "	L.B.	21 "
L.D.	20 "	J.F.	21 "
R.A.	37 "	R.W.	22 "
W.P.	22 "	E.B.	28 "
W.K.	32 "		
Number of Offenders Identified			29
Average Age of Offenders			28.6 Years

*This information was obtained from a report of the offenders' appearances in court which appeared in Lake City News.

had the normal age-spread that a large company would have in terms of its total labour force. This would suggest that younger members of the workforce were disproportionately involved, at least, in the overt activities associated with the wildcat and the maintenance of picket lines. This suggests the possibility of a peer group morale and militancy possibly based on the ecology of the plant.

For the last decade Lake Steel Company has been engaged in extensive and rapid growth, accompanied by the introduction of new technology. This is likely to be a continuing process at this plant for some time in the future.

The company's house organ in November 1967, for example, reported the completion and ignition of the world's largest coke oven battery at a cost of 23 million dollars. On this occasion the chairman of the board stated:

The building of vast new production facilities by Lake Steel is commonplace and with other projects now under construction and in the planning stage, the trend is unlikely to be interrupted. Our investment in this new coke oven battery is a clear indication of our faith in the future of Canada, of our conviction that the demand for steel will increase as our country grows, and that we intend to have the production capacity to meet the demand.

However, in the same issue of the Lake Steel house organ the Vice President for Marketing sounded a warning that the company faced strong competition.

With the tremendous changes taking place in the world market-place, Lake Steel is now faced with a very competitive field for its products. The company is not only faced with steel from other nations, but also with other producers making headway into what was formerly steel's domain.

There emerges a picture of a company engaged throughout the last decade in extensive expansion and technological change which, apparently, has in the last year or two come to fear strong competition from abroad in basic steel and substitute products from many quarters. What have these rather contradictory forces meant for the conditions of work of the labour force in the last decade at this plant?

Table V. Total Labour Force Employed by Lake Steel Company for the Period 1960-1967*

Year	Total Labour Force
1960	7,258
1961	8,801
1962	9,431
1963	9,823
1964	10,256
1965	10,828
1966	10,648
1967	11,281

*Source: Personal communication to the writer from the Labour Relations Supervisor, Lake Steel Company, dated February 8, 1968.

The first consequence of broad company policy has been a rather large increase in the total labour force employed over the last seven years. This is documented in Table V which shows the labour force growing steadily throughout the period from 7,258 workers in 1960 to 11,281 workers in 1967. However, if we transform this data into that of Table VI which shows the percentage employment gain of each year over its predecessor some interesting and significant short-term trends are evident. After a year of very large growth in 1961, employment growth stabilized around a mean of 5.3 per cent for the years 1962-65. In the year of the wildcat strike 1966, there was actually a reduction in the total labour force, but this has no significance for the analysis of the strike since the reduction did

Table VI. Labour Force Employed at Lake Steel Company, 1960-1967 - Percentage Change over Each Previous Year*

Year	Percentage Change Over Previous Year
1960	-----
1961	+21.26
1962	+7.16
1963	+4.16
1964	+4.41
1965	+5.58
1966	-1.66
1967	+5.94

*Based upon the employment figures provided in the previous Table.

not occur until November of that year. In fact, in the month of July, immediately preceding the start of the wildcat strike, the employment level at the plant reached an all time record of 11,762. Table VII shows the month by month employment level fluctuations for the years 1965-1966.

Table VII. Month by Month Employment Levels at Lake Steel Company for the years 1965-1966.*

	1965	Month	1966	
	10,299	January	10,941	
	10,449	February	11,083	
	10,572	March	11,045	
(10)	10,633	April	11,067	(9)
(302)	10,957	May	11,337	(310)
(505)	11,279	June	11,695	(521)
(597)	11,401	July	11,762	(530)
(419)	11,270	August	11,441	(392)
(21)	10,949	September	11,130	(19)
	10,937	October	11,103	
	10,892	November	10,491	Laid off-500
	10,828	December	10,648	

*Source: Personal communication to the writer from the Labour Relations Supervisor, Lake Steel Company, dated July 2, 1968.

Figures in brackets indicate the number of students hired for vacation relief. These are included in the total figures.

Despite the employment stability in the plant, a source of concern and dissatisfaction for the workers was associated with the consequences of the continuous application of new technology for the patterns and distribution of jobs available. This had two effects: it created new types of jobs and it changed the nature of others. These developments called for changes in the relationships of workers to their jobs which, in some respects, appeared threatening to them. While job security was not an important factor prior to 1966, the question of "job integrity" went right back to the introduction of new technology to the operations. A researcher who interviewed a cross section of workers at the plant following the strike has stated that:

The workers' fears were largely concerned with "job integrity" rather than employment insecurity. My feelings are that this had two aspects: a psychological fear, having spent so long acquiring a skill to have its efficacy challenged, is a challenge to the worker's occupational identity; and secondly, it provoked personal fears as to one's ability to adapt to this new skill in the case of retraining being offered. There was also much discussion and a great deal of discontent over what sort and to whom should be available such retraining programs that were offered.81/

Fears of this genre were compounded by the fact that change could constitute a threat to a man's seniority since the seniority system in the plant was based upon a departmental system and was not transferable from one department to another. Miller and Form have pointed out that the build-up of seniority is a stabilizing factor in a worker's career:

As a worker acquires seniority, he stores up advantages over his fellow workers. Sometimes these advantages are formally written out in provisions for increases in wage or salary, or security against layoffs and dismissal. At other times they pile up as expectations in the minds of the workers' associates and in the minds of his employer. The prestige of experience displays itself in promotions, assignments to better machines or offices, and other special privileges of many different kinds. Seniority becomes a kind of insurance against the risks of economic fluctuations which create unemployment in the work force.82/

Presumably, the converse would also apply and any threat to the seniority system would have to be regarded as a source of instability. At the Lake Steel Company there could be expected to have been a build-up of anxiety associated with almost continuous innovation and its threat to job integrity. A company officer has stated that he is unable to accept the view that technological changes which took place in the company had a significant bearing on the wildcat strike. His position is founded on this rationale:

The kind of technological changes which had taken place in the company had been of an expansionary nature, i.e., introduction of new facilities, etc. This has not resulted in the displacement of personnel or the phasing out of jobs, but rather has provided a continuing expansion of the work force and an opportunity for employees to obtain better jobs.83/

It should be noted, however, that this rationale is based on a situation in which a company officer has all of the facts at his disposal. The workers' interpretation of the changes that

were occurring might be quite different. In fact, Tucker's finding that the workers were more concerned with what he has called "job integrity" rather than employment stability suggests that the situation was being defined differently by the parties.

There appears to have been a general feeling that the union had failed to protect the worker's job integrity. There were a number of reasons for this:

- (i) the inordinately large size of the membership;
- (ii) the failure of the union to cope adequately with many individual grievances;
- (iii) the tactical approach to the problem adopted by the union;
- (iv) the tactical approach adopted by management; and
- (v) the failure of the union to communicate the nature of the difficulties involved.

A local union of the size of Local 08 will, even under normal circumstances, have a considerable number of grievances to be dealt with. With continuous innovation producing changes in the nature of man-job relationships and threatening job integrity, the volume of grievances increased.^{84/} Furthermore, the nature of the resulting grievances was such that few of them could be dealt with at the lower shop levels by the local shop stewards. In the face of the volume of grievances the union adopted the tactic of selecting for further processing only those that involved a principle that applied to larger groups or categories of their membership. On the management side, the tactical approach taken was to retreat into a position of legal-

ism, i.e., they would only deal with matters that could be specifically shown to be a breach of the existing contract.^{85/} Since many of the problems associated with innovation were of an emergent nature, the union had little basis for achievement other than by proceeding to arbitration, as provided under the Ontario Law. This produced a stultification of the whole grievance process, the reasons for which were never successfully conveyed to the membership by the union. Thus, the average griever suffering from a threat to job integrity viewed himself being given the celebrated "runaround" by the union. It was in these terms that the union was viewed as failing by the membership.

We may summarize this section by noting that over the last decade structural strain emerged from the process of continuous technological change which produced some degree of threat to job integrity that the union was unable to cope with due to a combination of factors as outlined. Dissatisfaction with the situation tended to be directed against the union rather than the company as the union was perceived as failing in one of its basic functions. The union failed to communicate effectively the reasons for this failure to the membership.

4. Strain Flowing in From the Wider Social System

Members of any social system, such as a plant, are subject to all kinds of forces and influences flowing in from other and wider social systems. A number of these can be identified that are likely to have had some effect relative to the

wildcat strike at Lake Steel. From the most general to least general source these were:

- (i) a general inflationary condition in the country;
- (ii) a contagion effect from other wildcat strikes;
- (iii) suspicion that the law would be utilized by management to delay settlement of a new contract;
- (iv) publication of the company's financial position; and
- (v) the presence of outside contractors in the plant.

The mass media in Canada gave considerable attention to the inflationary trend developing there in 1966. This produced, at least, two general and direct responses. One was direct action by housewives on the question of the rising prices of food and involved organized protests and boycotts of supermarkets; another was the growing demands of union members for significant contract gains especially in the area of take-home pay. In that year, many settlement packages recommended by union leaders were rejected by their rank and file memberships.

One of the general factors contributing to the high contract expectations of union members in 1966 was the highly-publicized intervention by the federal government in the spring of the year to settle strikes or disputes by the St. Lawrence Seaway workers and the Quebec longshoremens. Some of these interventions resulted in the sanctioning of wage increases of 30 per cent. While it is true that these increases were for three-year periods and were sanctioned in the light of past defi-

ciencies and pressing needs in the particular situation, only the first part of the message was absorbed by most Canadian workers. The notion of a 30 per cent increase took on something of a mystical aura and may have been associated with the large number of strikes of all kinds that year. Also, a number of wildcat strikes were highly successful. With each success the contagion factor seemed to gain momentum.

Another factor bearing-in from the wider social system was the Lake Steel workers' experience of how the labour law of Ontario had been wielded by management, as they saw it, during the last set of contract negotiations, to drag the process on for months past the expiration of the old contract. They perceived the law as being weighted on the side of management and, apparently, some of them were intent upon short-circuiting it. A general disrespect for law may also have been engendered by the fact that labour leaders in Ontario had been involved in a process of widespread denigration of the labour laws in general, and the law with respect to the use of injunctions in strikes in particular, for a period of some months. This, at any rate, is a charge that has come from some sources.

A few days prior to the eruption of the wildcat strike the financial statement of Lake Steel Company was published showing a record profit of \$24.8 million for the first six months of the year, an increase of more than \$6 million for the same period of the previous year. That this information had an ironical impact upon some has been attested to above in

excerpts from interviews conducted during the strike.

While the workers at Lake Steel Company were being informed week by week, through newspapers and television, of the unusually large wage gains being made in various sectors of industry, many of them observed a much more meaningful contrast within the confines of their own plant. Over 1,000 construction workers, employees of outside contractors, had been working within the plant for a considerable period. It became general knowledge that these employees were being paid considerably higher wages than people with similar skills within the plant. This became a great discussion point with many of the men working for the Lake Steel Company. Although there were, of course, differences in the objective conditions and prospects of the two groups of workers, these tended to get lost in the discussion with only the significant wage differentials looming large. There was some feeling of relative deprivation among the regular plant employees. Katz has noted:

Worker deprivation leads most directly to conflict when it is experienced as a sharp and unfavourable contrast to an existing practice, standard, or expectation. When workers see their fellows who are performing the same type of work in a similar type of company in the same community get a raise in wages or a shorter work week, their dissatisfaction is readily directed against their own management.86/

This kind of contrast was experienced by the Lake Steel workers and must have produced a measure of relative deprivation. However, in this case the dissatisfaction was not directed against

management but against the union. The presence of the large construction crews within the plant provided a conspicuous basis for invidious comparison and discussion within the plant leading to the generation of discontent.

Here, we have identified a number of general and local sources of discontent emanating from other social systems. Perhaps we should also note that the existence of full, perhaps overfull, employment throughout the country at this time may have had some significance in the eventual decisions that some men made on the wildcat strike.

In the foregoing sections we have identified and described situations of strain which were extant in Local 08 - Lake Steel Company - situation prior to the outbreak of the wildcat strike. These are presented in summary form in Figure 1. It should be noted that the order of the presentation makes no pretense at allocating priority to the various sources of strain, i.e., the order in which the factors are listed has no particular significance.

Figure 1. Sources of Strain Associated with the Lake Steel Company Wildcat

Historical	Structural (Union)	Structural (Company)	Societary
1. Distrust of local and national union officers	1. Distrust of negotiating committee	1. Consequences of technological change	1. Inflation
2. Dissatisfaction with previous contract	2. Perceived dominance by union's area supervisor	2. Legalistic grievance handling	2. Influence of other wildcat strikes
3. Growth of anti-administration factions	3. Activities of factions		3. Perception of role of labour law
	4. Failures of the grievance procedures		4. Other contract settlements
	5. Ineffective communications between negotiating committee and membership		5. Comparisons of wages with those of contract workers

THE RELATIONSHIP OF MULTIPLE STRAINS TO THE
EMERGENCE OF THE WILDCAT STRIKE

As a prerequisite of assessing the significance of the various types of strain, it is necessary to distinguish the early stages of the phenomenon. The wildcat strike exhibits three major stages which are relevant to this kind of analysis:

- (i) the build-up of strain prior to the wildcat;
- (ii) the eruption of the wildcat; and
- (iii) the consolidation of the wildcat.

These three stages do not, of course, exhaust the total process, but they do take us to the point where the wildcat is established and, therefore, are the stages that are relevant to a discussion of causes. In the case being analyzed here, stages (i) and (iii) involved a much larger public than stage (ii). This requires identification of the various publics involved and some discussion of their differential participation. Basically, we must address the question of cause not only to the group which originated the wildcat strike, but also to the much larger group which recognized and supported it. It is the latter question which is most crucial since it is the participa-

tion of the mass which transforms the small-group incident into an episode of collective behaviour.

The Build-Up of Strain

The activities of the anti-administration factions in the plant was one of the key factors in the development of discontent and strain among the general membership. Partially due to the size of the local, the union was unable to communicate effectively with its members. In this situation, the factions took on the role of defining situations and developments for the workers in the plant. Since the factions were interested in achieving power through election, their definitions of various situations and the response of the incumbent officers to them tended to be of a nature that would discredit the incumbents.

It was in these terms that dissatisfaction with the previous contract and the manner in which it was achieved was generated. This then served as a basis for the generation of further distrust of the Negotiating Committee in 1966. The spread of distrust at that time was greatly facilitated by the fact that the committee, for tactical reasons, adopted a secretive approach to developments in the negotiation process. This communications failure was a crucial source of strain since it permitted the situation to be defined by the factions in such a way that anxiety and distrust became very widespread.

A second communications failure on the part of the union was associated with the structural strains emanating

from the company's activities in the area of technological change and their strategy in the handling of the resulting grievances. The ongoing process of rapid technological change produced a large volume of grievances that could not be adequately handled by the union. This problem was exacerbated by the company's retreat into a legalistic posture with respect to grievances. The failure of the union to effectively communicate the reasons for the stultification of the grievance process to the membership led to widespread discontent which was directed against the union since it was the union that was perceived as failing.

The forces of strain flowing in from the wider society are probably best regarded as secondary factors in the build-up of strain prior to the wildcat.

It is judged that the key factor in the build-up of strain was the activities of the two factions. These factions engaged in a continuous process of spreading discontent and distrust of the incumbent executive. Their dissemination of particular definitions of historical and emergent situations in the plant and local union were designed to discredit the incumbents. This explains why the primary direction of hostility during the wildcat was against the union rather than the company.

The autonomy faction, being "true believers", had wider objectives: they wished to discredit not only the incumbents in local union office, but the whole national and international structure of the union. Herein lies the fundamental

difference between the autonomy faction and the left-wing faction. This also explains the "scapegoating" that the union's Area Supervisor was subjected to. He was the nearest representative of the wider union organization that the autonomists wished to attack. The development of the notion that the local union was under the domination of the national-international hierarchy is also explicable in terms of the objectives of the autonomy faction.

The above analysis is not intended to underplay such sources of strain as the continuous introduction of technology and the problems that this created. However, it is important to recognize that the factions, in terms of their own objectives, tended to interpret all problems that arose as failures of the incumbent union administration and to convey such interpretations to the general membership. This explains not only the fact that the primary direction of hostility was against the union, but also the fact that hostility toward the company was, for all practical purposes, non-existent.

What the factions did was to create a generalized belief that the local union officers were not to be trusted. Further, that they were under the domination and control of the national-international hierarchy and that this hierarchy could not be trusted to act in the interests of the members.

The process of creating this belief went right back to the signing of the previous contract and was reinforced and expanded by the continuous definition of emergent events and

developments as further "proofs" of the inadequacies of the local union and the national-international hierarchy. By the time the negotiations commenced for the new contract in 1966, there was a widespread generalized belief that had been built up throughout the membership that the union Negotiating Committee was not to be trusted. The lack of communications on the substantive progress of negotiations, exploited by the factions, brought all these latent fears and anxieties to the surface. It is within this general emotional context that we must examine the precipitating incident and events immediately prior to it if we are to understand the widespread support that the action was accorded by the whole work force in this highly-segmented plant.

The Eruption of the Wildcat Strike

The eruption of a wildcat strike is usually associated with a precipitating incident in response to which a small group of workers initiated the wildcat. This precipitating incident is often wrongly accorded the status of the "cause" of the wildcat. The position taken here is that the content or issue associated with the precipitating incident often has little intrinsic explanatory power, i.e., the eruption of the wildcat strike cannot be explained in terms of the particular incident associated with its eruption. Without the prior build-up of more general sources of strain, an identical incident would not result in the occurrence of a wildcat. In this sense, the eruption of a wildcat strike may be viewed as the end of one process as well as

the beginning of another one. It is the end of the build-up of covert discontent and the beginning of overt action.

The details of the actual precipitating incident in this case have been documented above. It remains to be analyzed in terms of cause. Prior to this, note must be taken of a number of other incidents which preceded this one. For example, a leaflet was circulated in the open hearth department one week prior to the wildcat calling upon the workers to stage a wildcat on the following Monday. There was nothing on the leaflet which would indicate its source. The message was later circulated by word of mouth that the wildcat should be held off until the Wednesday so that workers would qualify for holiday pay for the Monday which was a civic holiday. To qualify for payment of a civic holiday workers have to work the shifts before and after the holiday.

There was also a work slowdown by some 200 men in another department about a week before the wildcat, ostensibly over a question of payments.

Informants advised that there was a lot of talk in the plant in the week preceding its actual occurrence about a wildcat strike being in the offing. The stories were that first one department and then another were getting ready to pull a wildcat. One union officer who was interviewed said that he was sure that a wildcat was in the making three days before it occurred.87/

With respect to precipitating incidents there is always some question of just how spontaneous the workers' response has been to the particular situation or incident. In this case there is evidence of a measure of leadership and organization. One union source said that he was sure that members of both the autonomy group and the left-wing group were involved, though not directly, in the initiation of the wildcat.
88/ It will be recalled that as soon as news of the eruption of the wildcat was received at the meeting in the union hall, a group of stewards left the meeting and took up picket positions at the plant gates - gates other than those manned by the original wildcatters. They also had picket signs with them which had been prepared in advance. The small group of 20 men who initiated the wildcat were all young and inexperienced in the matter of conducting strikes and yet the shutdown of the main plant and its subsidiaries was carried out in a systematic manner. As one officer of the local observed:

These young fellows were guided from behind the scenes by older, experienced men. They were doing things that only experienced men would know how to do. For example, groups were organized to go down to the subsidiary plants and get them to stay out of the jobs. Also, they found out that some people, such as supervisors, were using boats to get into the plant - they tried to stop this - this showed organization.89/

The timing of the precipitating incident also lends credence to the theory of organization behind the wildcat. It occurred at the last possible moment that it was likely to be successful. By the following day, the stewards would have

circulated throughout the plant the report of the Negotiating Committee that an early and specific deadline had been set for the completion of contract talks or balloting for a strike vote. This information was actually being conveyed to the stewards when the wildcat erupted. If it had been conveyed to the membership in the plant the following day there would have been little support for a wildcat since the possibility of a legal strike would have been within reasonable prospect. In this connection, a union officer stated:

The dissident group knew they would lose all their influence if the Negotiating Committee had come up with a good recommendation. Their objective was to discredit the Negotiating Committee, the Executive, and the international union.90/

The leaders of the factions were conspicuous by their absence on the picket lines during the strike. This is quite understandable in terms of the heavy legal penalties that may be imposed upon clearly identified leaders of wildcat strikes. Members of the autonomy group, however, were actively and militantly involved in the picket lines from the outset of the wildcat. In support of the position that there was probably some covert organization, a union officer stated:

The young fellows who walked out must have been getting influence somewhere because none of them knew why they were going on a wildcat. These young men were under the impression that the whole plant was coming out. They went round a couple of mills, but they failed to pick up any followers.91/

Although the initiating group failed to lead the rest of the men out of the plant, they, and their supporters, did persuade the men going on-shift to recognize the picket lines. At this point the initiating process ended and the consolidation of the wildcat began.

The Consolidation of the Wildcat Strike

While most of the men working at Lake Steel Company finished their shift the night that the wildcat was initiated, the ongoing shift did not cross the picket lines. Further, many of the men joined the picket lines when they came off their shift. Also despite the strong intervention of the local union officers the following morning, there was no attempt by the morning shift to cross the picket lines. Even when the union distributed leaflets declaring the strike to be illegal and requesting the men to return to work at their normal shift it had no effect other than the generation of further hostility to the union. The establishment of the picket lines appears to have been sufficient to elicit a general response of both solidarity with the wildcatters and widespread anti-union sentiments

The union immediately sought to act as an agency of social control in the situation. They dispatched stewards to the picket lines to attempt to dissuade the men from carrying on the wildcat. All such efforts proved to be in vain. The union had lost control of the situation and the membership - a situation that was to persist for the next six days and which only terminated by the ballot vote conducted at the mass union meeting the following Sunday.

The response of the membership to the wildcat strike was, of course, variable. We might say that there was a wide spectrum of member involvement ranging from active promulgation of the wildcat to total indifference. Despite this, the significant fact was that there was no attempt to challenge the pickets even though the union had called upon the men to return to work. This response constituted a rejection of the local union and its officers. Such a situation is only explicable in terms of the previous activities of the factions. This analysis is supported by the fact that the primary direction of the members' hostility was against the union.

In this section the various sources of strain have been identified and discussed in terms of the build-up and other early stages of the wildcat strike. Despite the variety of strains that were operating in the situation, the role and activities of the two-anti-administration factions is regarded as the crucial element in the emergence of the wildcat and the workers' response to it.

VI

CONSEQUENCES OF THE WILDCAT STRIKE

The most significant consequences of this wildcat strike relate to the local union and its three factions, all of which were affected in important ways. There were also concrete consequences for the 51 workers involved in picket line incidents who were subjected to fines by the civil courts as well as dismissal or suspension from their jobs by the company. The majority of these persons, but not all of them, were rehired by the company over a period following the wildcat.

There were really few consequences from the company's point of view other than the immediate inconvenience and disruption caused by the wildcat with its attendant loss of production. So far as the contract itself is concerned, the strike probably had a very minimal effect on either its content or the date of settlement. The parties were so close to a potential settlement when the wildcat occurred that it is doubtful that any real material difference was made by it. It did cause the company to engage in some reconsideration of the nature of their communications with workers through their first-line supervisors

with respect to developments in the negotiation process. Since the company defined the wildcat as largely stemming from a failure of the union to communicate with their members, they began to give some consideration to how they themselves might utilize their foremen in this task.92/

The Autonomy Group

Since members of the autonomy group had taken an active and militant role on the picket lines during the wildcat, they enjoyed enhanced status following it. The first opportunity to test their new-found strength came at a regular membership meeting where delegates were to be selected to attend the Canadian Policy Conference of the union and the Canadian Labour Congress Convention. They were able to generate enough support to take 14 of the 21 places on the delegations. They were now in the position that they were posing a serious threat to the incumbent administration. With the elections for the local executive committee and other local offices scheduled for June 1967, this threat was keenly felt by the incumbents. The autonomy group also presented a serious threat to the national organization with their demands for increased autonomy and their suspected preference for the philosophies of the C.N.T.U. Thus, there was a strongly felt need from two sources to remove this group from the forthcoming contest for control of the local.

The union's Area Supervisor led the attack on the autonomy group. On the basis of the contents of pamphlets that

they had introduced into the plant, he accused the leadership of the group of slander and, in due course, succeeded in having them suspended from the union. In this way, they were prevented from taking part in the contest for control of the local in the June 1967 elections. This appears to have been an unusually harsh action, particularly in view of the fact that the "out" factions of this local have had a long history of virulent pamphleteering. However, it is explicable in view of the fact that the autonomy group were posing a new kind of threat to the organization as a whole. Opposition factions in the past had really grounded their attack on incumbent personalities and their shortcomings. Previous factions posed no threat to the national organization and their ultimate loyalty lay with the international. The autonomy group, however, appeared to be bent upon not only taking over control of the local union, but also using this as a base to advance the cause of increased Canadian autonomy. Also, the possibility of eventual secession from the international hovered in the background. In these circumstances, it may be inferred that the union's Area Supervisor was probably under pressure from the National and International offices to deal with this threat to the organization.

Although the incumbent officers were not anxious to support the early efforts of the area supervisor to have the leaders of the autonomy group suspended from the union, in time they did swing to his support. The suspensions dealt with the threat temporarily. At the time of this writing the autonomy group appear to be once again attempting to gather their strength.

The Right-Wing and Left-Wing Groups

The consequences of the wildcat for the right-wing, incumbent group and the left-wing group may be discussed together as they are closely interrelated.

With the leadership of the autonomy group removed from the electoral scene by suspension from the union, the electoral contest resumed its standard, dichotomous pattern of a struggle between the left-wing group and the incumbent right-wing group. While the pattern of electoral contest was the same as had previously obtained, the wildcat did make a difference in that it had activated and concentrated dissatisfaction with the incumbent administration and their performance in the negotiations.

The right-wing slate, headed by the incumbent President, chose to run on their record. They emphasized their contract accomplishments in the area of pension gains and made a plea for the continuation of "good government". The left-wing challengers, led by a man who had previously only held minor office as a Divisional Grievance Chairman, formally advocated that it was "time for a change" and informally spread the view that the membership had once again been "sold down the river" in the recent contract negotiations.

In the elections held on June 26, 1967, most of the incumbent right-wing group were swept out of office. Only three of them survived: the treasurer, a guard, and one of trustees. The incumbent president was defeated by a 3 to 1 majority.

VII

SUMMARY

The major consequence of the wildcat strike at the Lake Steel Company was the defeat of the incumbent, right-wing group of officers in the local's elections the following year by the left-wing faction. It was largely responsible for the left-wing faction achieving its objective of gaining control of the local.

The autonomy faction gained increased prestige as a result of its members' activities during the wildcat, but these activities so crystallized the group's threat to the wider organization that steps were taken to have its leadership suspended from the union. This effectively removed the faction from entering the contest to gain control of the local in the subsequent elections.

The potential for continued conflict, along factional lines, remains very strong in the future of Local 08.

REFERENCES

- 1/ See Appendix A.1.
- 2/ See Appendix A.2.
- 3/ See Appendix A.3.
- 4/ Company Case Study, January 27, 1967; page 1
- 5/ Interview #5; page 1
- 6/ Interview #3; page 1
- 7/ Ibid., pages 1,2
- 8/ Company Case Study, op. cit.; page 1
- 9/ Ibid.; page 2
- 10/ Loc. cit.
- 11/ Company Case Study, op. cit.; page 3
- 12/ Lake City News, August 4, 1966
- 13/ Loc. cit.
- 14/ Company Case Study, op. cit.; page 6
- 15/ See Appendix A.4.
- 16/ Keith L. Tucker, Protest in an Industrial Setting: A Case Study. (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, McMaster University, Hamilton, 1967); page 22
- 17/ Lake City News, August 4, 1966
- 18/ Ibid.
- 19/ See Appendix A.5.
- 20/ Lake City News, August 4, 1966
- 21/ Ibid.
- 22/ Lake City News, August 5, 1966
- 23/ Company Case Study, op. cit.; page 4
- 24/ Ibid.; page 2, and Lake City News, August 5, 1966
- 25/ Lake City News, August 5, 1966

- 26/ Lake City News, August 5, 1966
- 27/ Loc. cit.
- 28/ Provincial Star, August 5, 1966
- 29/ Loc. cit.
- 30/ Loc. cit.
- 31/ Company Case Study, op. cit.; page 4
- 32/ Ibid.; page 5
- 33/ Lake City News, August 8, 1966
- 34/ Ibid.; August 5, 1966
- 35/ Provincial News, August 6, 1966
- 36/ Provincial Star, August 6, 1966
- 37/ Ibid.; August 5, 1966
- 38/ Provincial News, August 8, 1966
- 39/ Union Informant, Communication #6; page 2
- 40/ Provincial News, August 8, 1966
- 41/ Lake City News, August 8, 1966
- 42/ Loc. Cit.
- 43/ Interview #4, pages 1,2
- 44/ See Appendix A.6.
- 45/ Interview #5; page 2
- 46/ Ibid.; pages 2,3
- 47/ See Appendix A.7.
- 48/ Loc. cit.
- 49/ Lake City News, August 10, 1966
- 50/ Loc. cit.
- 51/ Provincial News, August 13, 1966
- 52/ See Appendix A.8.

- 53/ See Appendix A.9.
- 54/ Canadian Press Wire Story, August 24, 1966
- 55/ Union Informant, Communication #1
- 56/ See Appendix A.10.
- 57/ See Appendix A.11.
- 58/ See Appendix A.12.
- 59/ See Appendix A.13.
- 60/ Based on figures quoted in Lake City News, August 5, 1966
- 61/ Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behaviour. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).
- 62/ Ibid.; page 8
- 63/ In communication #7, a union informant alleges that the National and District Directors of the union "had been intimately involved in them (negotiations) throughout." What they did do was conduct further, almost secret, negotiations with the company under pressure from the provincial department of labour. A part of the settlement which has never been publicly acknowledged was the agreement by the provincial government that if they (Directors) could swing the settlement the government would open the roads to the northern mining camps which the mining companies had previously held closed as private property, forbidding entrance to all union organizers". If this claim is correct, this would provide a plausible explanation of the behaviour of the higher-level officers. Their long-range organizational objectives took precedence over short-term local objectives. The consequence of according such priority to organizational objectives was a lack of understanding of the situation at the local level and the generation of feelings of hostility to the union based on the interpretation that the members of the local felt that they had been "sold down the river" by the national officers.
- 64/ Tucker, op. cit.; page 9
- 65/ Interview #1; page 2
- 66/ Interview #2; page 3
- 67/ Tucker, op. cit.; page 8
- 68/ Ibid.; page 9

69/ Interview #5,; page 1

70/ Lake City News, August 5, 1966

71/ Loc. cit.

72/ Loc. cit.

73/ Loc. cit.

74/ Interview #1,; page 2

75/ This would appear to be an example of the way in which facts may be distorted, over time, possibly as a basis for "retroactive scapegoating". In actual fact, the man concerned joined the company staff in 1961 prior to negotiations. Further, he did not participate in Labour Relations, but joined the Employee Relations Section that is concerned with welfare work. One of the conditions that he laid down, according to the company, was that he would not participate in any way in the Labour Relations function if he were to join them.

76/ Union Informant, Communication #5,; page 3

77/ The following section has benefitted greatly from a close reading of Tucker, op. cit., as well as discussions with numerous officers of the local.

78/ Tucker, op. cit.,; page 84

79/ Loc. cit.

80/ A good discussion of this situation is presented in: John Crispo, International Unionism: A Study in Canadian-American Relations. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Company of Canada Limited, 1967). See especially chapter 8, page 267 where the author discusses the flow of funds and benefits across the border and reports that "the first report . . . was expected to reveal whether international unions as a whole were operating in the black or red in Canada". He goes on to observe "unfortunately, the information is presented in such a way that many assumptions and interpolations are necessary before one can even begin to draw any conclusions".

81/ Personal communication to the author from Keith L. Tucker, dated April 2, 1968.

82/ Derbert C. Miller and William H. Form, Industrial Sociology. (New York, Harper & Row, 1964, 2nd ed.); page 597.

83/ Personal communication to the author from the Labour Relations Supervisor of the Lake Steel Company, dated July 2, 1968.

- 84/ In Company communication #4, a company officer claims that during the contract period preceding the strike, the grievance volume was at an all-time low. Such a situation would have been consistent with the union's policy of only processing grievances that dealt with matters of principle. The volume of "felt grievances" among the employees, however, was undoubtedly much higher.
- 85/ In the same communication, the company officer admits that a legalistic approach was utilized, but claims that this is common to almost any major industry in Canada or the United States.
- 86/ Daniel Katz, "Satisfactions and Deprivations in Industrial Life", in Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross, Industrial Conflict. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954) p.88.
- 87/ Interview #2,; page 1
- 88/ Ibid.; pages 2,3
- 89/ Interview #1, pages 1,2
- 90/ Ibid.; page 1
- 91/ Interview #2,; page 1
- 92/ A company officer who read the preliminary draft of this study felt that it gave the impression that the company was relatively unconcerned about the wildcat strike. In Company Communication #4, page 3, he states: "This, I can assure you, is not true. The reluctance of the Company to make public statements during such situations probably conveys to the general public and to the employees that we are not particularly concerned other than with the 'immediate inconvenience and disruption which the strike caused'. The dangers to plant equipment in such a strike, of course, are paramount in that the loss of any of our major furnace operations can effectively cripple the plant for a considerable period of time. However, the Company is equally concerned about the apparent lack of communication between the workers and the company and/or the union which apparently exists during such time. . . We are giving serious consideration to our role in this area".

APPENDIX A

- A.1 Negotiating Committee Report, June 21, 1966,
"Talks Still Continuing"
- A.2 Negotiating Committee Report, July 21, 1966,
"Lake Steel Offer Rejected", "Conciliation
Board"
- A.3 Negotiating Committee Report, July 26, 1966,
"Conciliation Board Chairman Appointed"
- A.4 Local O8 Leaflet, August 4, 1966,
"No Authorized Strike"
- A.5 Lake City News, August 4, 1966,
"Lake Steel's Blast Furnaces Closed"
- A.6 Statement by 27 Disciplined Employees, August 8,
1966, "We Have Been Disciplined"
- A.7 Local O8 Leaflet, August 10, 1966,
"Negotiations Resumed"
- A.8 Local O8 Leaflet, August 13, 1966,
"It's No Secret"
- A.9 Dissident Faction Leaflet, August 21, 1966,
"Reject the Contract"
- A.10 Local O8 Leaflet, August 23, 1966,
Preparation for Strike Vote
- A.11 Local O8 Leaflet, August 29, 1966,
"Amended Contract Proposals" and Vote
- A.12 Local O8 Leaflet, August 29, 1966,
"Be Sure You Vote"
- A.13 Dissident Faction Leaflet, August 29, 1966,
"Think Before You Vote"

APPENDIX A.1

LOCAL 08

NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE REPORT

TALKS STILL CONTINUING:

As you are well aware, negotiations for renewal of the Collective Agreement are now under way between your Union and the Company.

After having complied with one of the provisions of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, namely; notifying the Company regarding our desire for changes in the Agreement, the Negotiating Committee met with them for the first time on Tuesday, May 24th.

Since then there have been a total of twelve meetings during which the Union amendments to the Agreement have been thoroughly discussed. The Company is also seeking changes to the Collective Agreement. Their proposed list is shorter and these items have been discussed thoroughly as well.

Members should realize that there is a great deal of explaining necessary in order to fully appreciate each party's proposals. For instance, the Union's proposals for amendments in the fields of Pensions, Job Training, Supplemental Unemployment Benefits, and many of the other items are complex and must be thoroughly understood by the Company before a new Collective Agreement is effected.

Without going into technicalities, the law provides that both parties "shall bargain in good faith and make every reasonable effort to make a collective agreement."

IF THE PARTIES ARE UNABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT DURING THE FIRST STAGE, THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT PROVIDES FOR THE ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES OF CONCILIATION SERVICES OR MEDIATION, WHICH MUST BE FOLLOWED.

Briefly, Conciliation Services can be applied for by either party and they consist of, first of all, the appointment of a Conciliation Officer by the Minister of Labour and if his efforts fail, then the appointment of a three-man Conciliation Board.

APPENDIX A.1 (Continued)

The appointment of a one-man mediator must be by mutual consent and the same time procedures apply to the single mediator as to the Conciliation Board. A mediator has all the powers of a Conciliation Board and his report has the same effect.

The union proposed mediation to which the company has refused to consent. Since mutual agreement is required mediation is not available to us. We have, therefore, applied for conciliation services and the company has indicated that they are not opposed to the application.

One of the "key" issues in this set of negotiations is the vast improvements needed in our Pension Agreement. We have submitted proposals to the company which could put our members, both past and present, in the forefront as far as pensions are concerned.

At this time, in spite of what you may have heard to the contrary, the company has made no offers of any kind to your committee.

Your committee, in accordance with the desires of the membership, will continue to bargain for a just and speedy settlement of all the issues in this set of negotiations. The Negotiating Committee will continue to make reports to you as regularly as we can. Don't listen to rumours, wait for these reports.

THE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE REQUESTS
YOUR
FULL SUPPORT AND CO-OPERATION

June 21, 1966

APPENDIX A.2

LOCAL 08

NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE REPORT

LAKE STEEL OFFER REJECTED

On Friday, July 8th, the company made an offer of settlement to the Negotiating Committee of Local 08. Although the offer appeared to indicate the company's desire to settle negotiations as quickly as possible, there were serious shortcomings in the company's proposal, particularly in the areas of Pensions, Supplemental Unemployment Benefits, Group Insurance and Training.

The Negotiating Committee subsequently reported to the Executive (July 12th) and Membership (July 13th) that they had rejected the company offer, this action was completely endorsed.

There has been some speculation as to the 'value' of the offer. Needless to say, the company and union opinions regarding the 'real worth' differ, and this is another reason for the rejection.

CONCILIATION BOARD

The Local has received notice from the Minister of Labour stating that a conciliation board has been established. The union nominee will be Mr. A.

We understand the company has appointed Mr. B as their nominee. To date the chairman of the Conciliation Board has not been selected, however, this should be settled within a few days.

Your Negotiating Committee has conveyed to the company, the desire of membership for a fair and equitable settlement to this set of negotiations.

THE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE REQUESTS

YOUR

FULL SUPPORT AND CO-OPERATION

July 21, 1966

APPENDIX A.3

LOCAL 08

NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE REPORT

CONCILIATION BOARD:

On Friday, July 22, 1966, after receiving official confirmation, your committee issued a 'press release' concerning the establishment of the Conciliation Board.

As previously reported to you in an earlier leaflet, the Board is composed of Mr. A., who will represent the union and Mr. B. for the company.

CHAIRMAN APPOINTED:

The Minister of Labour has confirmed the appointment of Judge C. to head up the Conciliation Board between the company and the union. Judge C. has a long and successful history of chairing Conciliation and Arbitration Boards.

MEETING DATES SET:

Even though Judge C. is very busy and his services are in high demand he has set the Board sittings at the earliest date possible -- commencing in Toronto next Friday, July 29, 1966.

MEETINGS WILL CONTINUE:

In the meantime, while awaiting the board sessions, the company and the union will continue their meetings in an effort to resolve as many items as possible before July 29, 1966.

APPENDIX A.3 (Continued)

EARLY SETTLEMENT OBJECTIVE:

The Negotiating Committee is still maintaining the objective, endorsed by the membership, of a fair, equitable and speedy settlement to this set of negotiations.

THE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE REQUESTS

YOUR

FULL SUPPORT AND CO-OPERATION

July 26, 1966

APPENDIX A.4

LOCAL 08

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA

NO AUTHORIZED STRIKE

There is no authorized strike at the Lake Steel Company. Last night a meeting of all the stewards endorsed an Executive and Negotiating Committee recommendation that our men remain at work and that the Negotiating Committee continue to meet with the Conciliation Board until, as the Board had suggested, an agreement was reached or our time had run out this week-end.

NO VOTE -- NO STRIKE

You, as a member of Local 08, have always run this union. Your rights to work and your rights to have a say in the affairs of your union have been barred by the irresponsible action of a group of employees. We urge you on behalf of the Executive, and Negotiating Committee and the steward body to report for work at your normal shift and to work without interruption in a normal fashion until a decision has been made by this union.

BY LAW WILDCATTERS DON'T GET WELFARE

Only the membership can authorize a strike, officially and in

the proper democratic manner. The union cannot endorse a "wild-cat" strike and BY LAW there cannot be any strike relief or welfare payments while this unofficial work stoppage continues.

Your union can serve you only if we act as an organized group. This strike is leaderless, directionless and futile.

Negotiations cannot proceed under these circumstances -- RETURN TO WORK AT YOUR NORMAL SHIFT. Strike action has not been sanctioned by your union membership, Executive, Stewards or Negotiating Committee.

RETURN TO WORK AT YOUR NORMAL SHIFT

August 4, 1966

LAKE STEEL'S BLAST FURNACES CLOSED

The giant blast furnaces at Lake Steel Company's Works have been banked and shut down successfully, a company official said today.

"The danger of damage to the machinery is past, and no immediate danger exists," the official said.

About 400 supervisory personnel on the job at the plant this morning tackled the difficult job of shutting down the furnaces.

Officials feared at first that 200 more men would be required to bring production machinery to a halt.

Blast furnaces - the heart of the steelmaking process - can be made ready for idle periods by a small crew. Lake Steel's four iron-extracting monsters should be brought under control in a matter of a few hours by a handful of supervisory personnel, according to a steel expert.

The giant brick-lined furnaces, kept hot whether working or out of production, operate this way:

Iron ore, coke and limestone are dumped into the top of the furnace and exposed to a roaring blast of hot air.

Under heat the solids melt. The heavier molten iron sinks to the bottom of the furnace while impurities - molten slag - rise to the top.

Holes punched at the top and bottom of the furnace drain off the fluids separately. More ore, coke and limestone are added in the process, making it a continuous operation.

To stop a blast furnace, steelmakers drain off the molten iron and slag without adding more of the ore-coke-limestone recipe.

Airholes - called tuyeres - feeding the hot blast into the furnace are plugged. Some of the holes are left open so the fur-

nace will receive enough heat to prevent damage to refractory bricks lining its interior.

The furnace can be closed down in a relatively short time, but needs about 68 hours to get started again.

August 4, 1966

APPENDIX A.6

WE HAVE BEEN DISCIPLINED

We the undersigned employees of the Lake Steel Company have been penalized as a result of the strike at the company. We have filed grievances with the company and are asking that you, our brothers in Local 08, remain at work in order that the union can proceed to the Conciliation Board. Any work stoppage at this time will only put other workers in the same position as we are, and the union will be helpless to assist them and us.

We have asked the union to distribute this message to you.

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

CONCILIATION BOARD MEETS TOMORROW

The Conciliation Board set up to deal with the dispute between Local 08 and the Lake Steel Company will reconvene tomorrow.

Your union asks for the solid support of all its membership at this very difficult time.

The grievances mentioned above will obviously end up at the Conciliation Board, because the Lake Steel Company, as has been its usual policy, has proposed that all grievances be resolved before a new agreement is signed.

THE CONCILIATION BOARD WILL NOT MEET TO HANDLE THESE
GRIEVANCES OR THE NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS
WE REMAIN AT WORK.

August 8, 1966

APPENDIX A.7

NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED

Judge C. postponed the meetings of the Conciliation Board until our members returned to work, and the Judge stated that the meetings would resume on Tuesday afternoon, August 9th.

Because of this delay in the talks, the Negotiating Committee will be unable to make a report that would contain any change from that given on Sunday in the Civic Stadium. Therefore, the regular membership meeting is postponed to August 17, and at this meeting the Negotiating Committee will make its report. The hour and place will be announced later.

IN SPITE OF OUR RESENTMENT OF THE COMPANY'S DISCIPLINARY ACTION AND THE ATTITUDE OF SOME FOREMEN SINCE THE RETURN TO WORK, JUDGE C. HAS STATED THAT THE BOARD WILL CONSIDER THE DISPUTE ONLY IF WE REMAIN AT WORK.

08 MEMBERS RECEIVE
SPECIAL ASSISTANCE

Our union, by law, cannot contribute financially to the support of members involved in an illegal strike. Therefore, so that the employees who have been suspended will have an income while their cases are being handled by the Negotiating Committee and the Conciliation Board, the Executive has arranged with the National Employment Service to obtain temporary employment for them. The N.E.S. will send special representatives to the union hall today, Wednesday, from 9:00 a.m. to rush this through.

These members have in no way severed their connections with the Lake Steel Company, and our union is doing everything possible to assist them.

Date: August 10, 1966

IT'S NO SECRET!

Radio, television and newspaper reports of the meetings between the Company and our Negotiating Committee come into Lake City at frequent intervals, and if you have been listening carefully, you will know that no two of them are the same. The reporters, who have a job to do, are earning their keep by making more or less educated guesses at what is taking place behind the closed doors of the committee rooms.

THEY DON'T HAVE TO GUESS. WHAT IS GOING ON IS THAT OUR COMMITTEE IS MEETING WITH THE COMPANY AND THE GOVERNMENT CHIEF CONCILIATION OFFICER IN A LAST DITCH ATTEMPT TO REACH AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT, IF POSSIBLE WITHOUT A STRIKE.

As soon as there is something to report from the meeting with the Chief Conciliator a recommendation will be put to the membership for action at the earliest possible time.

No logical decisions can be made by anyone until this last ditch report is made by Mr. D., but our Local is ready to call a vote within very short notice of the report's release.

THE DATE WHEN IT IS LEGALLY POSSIBLE FOR US TO GO ON STRIKE IF THERE IS NO SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT IS NOT FAR AWAY. BEFORE ANY STRIKE IS LEGAL THERE MUST BE A VOTE OF THE UNION MEMBERSHIP, AND WE WILL, AS USUAL, VOTE AT THE PLANT GATES.

REMEMBER -----WE ARE ENTITLED TO MAKE OUR OWN DECISIONS. WE ARE ENTITLED TO A VOTE ON OUR FUTURE, AND OUR UNION WILL PROVIDE THE POLLING PLACES.

August 13, 1966

APPENDIX A.9

REJECT THE CONTRACT

If we accept the contract proposals, it will be a black day in the history of the Canadian Trade Union Movement.

We will be accepting a contract in exchange for the jobs and livelihoods of 51 of our fellow trade unionists.

We think the pension plan obtained is a significant improvement, but this could only have been obtained, through the militancy and discipline shown by the membership.

There are other inadequacies in the contract proposals:

- 1) A 3 YEAR CONTRACT IS ECONOMICALLY UNREALISTIC.
- 2) NO OFFER FOR EXTENDED VACATIONS.
- 3) NO OFFER FOR STATUTORY HOLIDAYS.
- 4) NO CHANGE IN THE CONTRACT DATE.
- 5) NO COMMITTEE SET UP TO STUDY BONUS PRODUCTION PROGRAM.

Remember it was the courage and self-discipline shown by our members who were victimized, who put their names on a leaflet urging you to remain at work. Now these 51 members "need your support."

We urge you to reject the contract for the reasons stated above.

August 21, 1966

LOCAL 08

THE EXECUTIVE OF LOCAL 08, MEETING TOGETHER WITH THE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE, DECIDED TODAY TO MAKE TWO REQUESTS OF THE MINISTER OF LABOUR:

1. That he make his good offices available to assist to resolve the dispute between the Lake Steel Company and the United Steelworkers of America, and
2. That he immediately release the report of the Conciliation Board in order that the union will be in a legal position to call a strike, if necessary, to resolve this dispute.

The Steelworkers Union stands ready to negotiate a settlement at any time.

The Negotiating Committee and the Executive are making the necessary preparations to conduct a strike vote.

August 23, 1966

LOCAL 08CONTRACT ACCEPTANCE OR STRIKE VOTE

There will be a secret ballot vote at the plant gates on Tuesday, August 30, 1966. Details of ballot, times and polling places on back page.

AMENDED CONTRACT PROPOSALS

1. An additional across the board increase of 3¢ per hour on the first year base rate. The first year increase will now be 13¢ per hour across the board for the whole Lake Steel Company chain.

Wage Scale for Local 08 Members will be as follows:

JOB CLASS	FROM AUG. 1/66	FROM AUG. 1/67	FROM AUG. 1/68
1	\$2.33	\$2.41	\$2.51
2	2.40	2.485	2.587
3	2.47	2.56	2.664
4	2.54	2.635	2.741
5	2.61	2.71	2.818
6	2.68	2.785	2.895
7	2.75	2.86	2.972
8	2.82	2.935	3.049
9	2.89	3.01	3.126
10	2.96	3.085	3.203
11	3.03	3.16	3.28
12	3.10	3.235	3.357
13	3.17	3.31	3.434
14	3.24	3.385	3.511
15	3.31	3.46	3.588
16	3.38	3.535	3.665
17	3.45	3.61	3.742
18	3.52	3.685	3.819
19	3.59	3.76	3.896
20	3.66	3.835	3.973
21	3.73	3.91	4.05
22	3.80	3.985	4.127
23	3.87	4.06	4.204
24	3.94	4.135	4.281
25	4.01	4.21	4.358
26	4.08	4.285	4.435
27	4.15	4.36	4.512
28	4.22	4.435	4.589

11. For the Bloom and Billet Mills and the Conditioning Departments, the incentive differentials have been amended and improved as follows:

#1 Bloom & Billet Mill

Job Number	Job Title	Incentive Differential
8	Recorder Charging	.085
27	Asst. Roller	.494
28	Senior Manipulator	.548
29	Manipulator	.868
30	Spellhand Rolling	.448
51	Asst. Roller	.242
52	Optr. Blm. & Flying Shear	.256
53	Optr. Crp. Shear & Trans	.119
56	Lab Hot Bed Runout	.542
66	Asst. Shipper	.048
67	Craneman Bloom Yard	.228
68	Hooker Hot Bed	.542
71	Marker	.079
817	Pipefitter	.086
826	Millwright	.244
828	Helper Millwright	.068
6	Asst. Heater	.511
12	Bottom Maker	.621
13	Hlpr. Bottom Maker	.256
7	Craneman Soaking Pit	.371
827	Mlwt. Cr. Rpr. and Mtce.	.153
829	Hlpr. Mlwt. Cr. Rpr. Hlpr.	.278

Slabbing Mill

Job Number	Job Title	Incentive Differential
6	Operator - Soaking Pits	.511
7	Craneman - Soaking Pits	.505
8	Ingot Dispatcher	.018
22	Manipulator	.708
24	Operator Shear	.189
35	Operator Scarfing Machine	.111
43	Craneman - Yard	.228
817	Pipefitter	.086
826	Millwright	.244
828	Helper Millwright	.068

#1 Conditioning

Job Number	Job Title	Incentive Differential
5	Chipper	.628
6	Chisel Grinder	.708
19	Inspector	.264
1	Scarfer - Cold	.342
2	Scarfer - Hot	.377
3	Helper Scarfer - Cold	.262
4	Helper Scarfer - Hot	.298
15	Scarfer - Cold	.342
16	Scarfer - Hot	.377
17	Helper Scarfer - Cold	.262
18	Helper Scarfer - Hot	.298
19	Operator Scarf Mach. - Cold	.212
20	Operator Scarf Mach. - Hot	.312
12	Inspector	.264

#2 Conditioning

27	Scarfer - Cold	.342
28	Scarfer - Hot	.377
29	Helper Scarfer - Cold	.262
30	Helper Scarfer - Hot	.298
39	Inspector	.264

The seniority list for #1 Bloom Mill and the Slabbing Mill will remain as a unit until January 1st, 1968. Number 1 and 2 Conditioning Departments will have a common seniority list until that date also. On January 1, 1968, there will be four separate seniority units, Bloom Mill; Slabbing Mill; #1 Conditioning Department; #2 Conditioning Department.

Effective immediately, the provisions of Sections 7.11 and Section 8 will not apply between Bloom Mill and Slabbing Mill or between the Conditioning Departments.

III. Agreement regarding Disciplined Employees. The company has agreed to review all of the discipline cases as soon as possible, but not later than September 30, 1966. Any of these cases not resolved to the satisfaction of our Grievance Committee will be mediated by Judge C.

THIS RECOMMENDED SETTLEMENT CONTAINS

THE COMPANY'S FINAL POSITION

IN VIEW OF THIS, THOSE MEMBERS WHO VOTE WILL DECIDE By Voting "YES" -- To accept the recommendation of the Negotiating Committee OR By voting "NO" -- To strike on Saturday, September 3, at 7:00 a.m.

LOCATION OF POLLING STATIONS

SCALE GATE
MAIN GATE
M. GATE
D. STREET
NO. 2 ROD MILL
REINFORCING
20" MILL

Tuesday, August 30, 1966 ---- 6:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m.
1:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.
10:00 p.m. to 12:30 a.m.

and at the Steelworkers Centre

Tuesday, August 30, 1966 ---- 9:00 a.m. to 12 midnight

YOU MUST PRESENT YOUR BLACK PAY STUB IN ORDER TO VOTE

Dated September 1, 1966

Students and non-members will not be permitted to vote

HERE IS A SAMPLE OF THE BALLOT YOU WILL USE

ARE YOU IN FAVOUR OF ACCEPTING THE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE RECOMMENDA- TION TO ACCEPT THE CONTRACT?	"YES"	
	"NO"	
A "NO" VOTE WILL BE AUTHORIZATION TO CALL A STRIKE ON SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 1966, at 7:00 a.m.		

THE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE AND THE EXECUTIVE OF LOCAL 08
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, UNANIMOUSLY RECOMMEND ACCEPTANCE
OF THIS CONTRACT.

August 29, 1966

APPENDIX A.12

BE SURE YOU VOTE

YOU HAVE RIGHTS TOO:

This morning there was an unconstitutional meeting of a rump group at which several decisions were made:

1. Some form of boycott of the vote to take place thereby denying the rights of every member to make a determination on either contract acceptance or strike Saturday, September 3.
2. To issue a leaflet into the plant.
3. Take up a petition calling for the resignation of the Executive.

REMEMBER ---- a minority rump group denied you the right to work two weeks ago and caused 51 people to be severely disciplined.

Minority groups have rights, but so do the majority. Your elected Negotiating Committee and your elected Executive have placed a recommendation for a contract settlement before you. You have a right to vote on that recommendation.

Improvements were made in the company's offer. It is now the company's final position. We must either accept the contract or authorize a strike. The company's last offer stands with the

improvements shown on this morning's leaflet.

Your Executive and Negotiating Committee are now placing before you an opportunity to express your opinions. Either YES or NO.

THE ENTIRE MEMBERSHIP, BY MAJORITY VOTE, MUST MAKE THIS DECISION

August 29, 1966

THINK BEFORE YOU VOTE

A meeting took place at your Union Hall, Monday 29th of August, consisting of Stewards, Chief Stewards, and Members of Local 08.

It was emphatically stated, that the first condition of a new contract was the re-instatement of the 51 members who have been discharged.

The meeting was called to protest the dictatorial attitude, and policy of the president, international representative, and executive of Local 08, in their method used of informing the membership of a new proposed settlement to be voted on.

Our concern is to bring back democracy to the membership of Local 08.

CAN YOU SELL THESE 51 BROTHERS FOR THREE CENTS?

August 29, 1966

APPENDIX B

GREVE SAUVAGE A LAKE CITY

RESUME

Le présent document étudie une grève sauvage survenue l'été de 1966 en Ontario, dans l'industrie sidérurgique. Le document relate le développement de la grève, analyse ses nombreuses causes de même que ses répercussions.

Dans une première partie, l'auteur décrit la procédure habituelle de négociation collective qui a précédé la grève. Les pages les plus importantes décrivent, de façon très détaillée, le déclenchement de la grève. On y trouve aussi l'attitude de la compagnie et des agents du syndicat local et leurs efforts pour faire face à la situation, la conduite des dirigeants officiels et de leurs partisans dans le déroulement de ladite grève sauvage. Il décrit les efforts couronnés de succès des agents de la branche locale afin d'arracher leur autorité aux dirigeants officiels jusqu'à ce qu'ils reprennent contrôle de leurs membres et que le travail recommence. Le travail a immédiatement repris, la société a infligé des sanctions à quelques-uns des travailleurs qui avaient participé au conflit, et, comme l'étude le démontre, ces mesures disciplinaires ont failli déclencher une nouvelle grève sauvage, qui n'a été évitée que grâce aux initiatives rapides et habiles des agents du syndicat local.

Dans une deuxième partie, l'auteur décrit la reprise des négociations collectives et leur déroulement. Il montre comment les participants ont rejeté la première offre que les agents syndicaux ont avancée comme base de règlement. Ce rejet s'explique largement par le fait que, jusque-là, ces agents n'avaient pas convenablement résolu le problème qui se posait aux adhérents dont les activités pendant la grève sauvage avaient été sanctionnées. L'auteur décrit comment on a abouti au règlement final puis termine en évaluant le coût économique de cette grève sauvage.

Dans une troisième partie, l'auteur cite la théorie du comportement collectif énoncée par M. Smelser (Smelser, N., Theory of Collective Behaviour), ce qui suppose la reconnaissance du fait que le phénomène de la grève sauvage entre la catégorie générale du "comportement collectif" (collective behaviour), et que de plus, elles appartiennent à la sous-catégorie que M. Smelser nomme "explosion hostile" (hostile outburst). A l'instar de ce sociologue, l'auteur tente surtout d'identifier les tensions d'organisation, tensions qui expliquent en partie le déclenchement de cette explosion d'hostilité. Cette recherche va de pair avec celle des causes historiques de tension. Quatre sources principales de tension sont énoncées et analysées:

- (1) tension d'origine historique;
- (2) tension associée à l'organisation du syndicat:
 - a) local
 - b) extra-local;
- (3) tension due à l'organisation de l'usine; et
- (4) tension découlant du système social extérieur.

Enfin, l'étude décrit le rapport qui existe entre ces diverses sources et la grève sauvage.

Pour le présent phénomène, on a pu identifier un total de quinze générateurs de tension, (Voir figure 1). Mais, même si tous ont été identifiés, décrits et examinés, l'auteur déclare qu'il n'existe pas de méthodes scientifiques permettant de déterminer le rôle exact de chacun. On a évalué l'importance probable de chaque élément d'après la façon dont il a contribué à l'évolution de la grève sauvage en suivant la méthode suivante: observation directe du comportement ouvert associé avec l'événement au moment où il se passe, entrevues avec des participants, recours à des informateurs autorisés, et analyse de la documentation pertinente.

Trois principales sources historiques de tension se sont détachées:

- (1) méfiance à l'égard des agents du syndicat local et national;
- (2) mécontentement relatif à la convention précédente; et
- (3) croissance à l'intérieur du syndicat local de factions hostiles à l'administration.

Ces facteurs sont bien sûr liés, mais le plus important est le mécontentement vis-à-vis de la convention précédente; c'est d'ailleurs lui qui a permis aux factions de se développer et de répandre la méfiance envers les agents responsables du syndicat.

Pour ce qui est de l'organisation de syndicat, l'auteur du présent rapport a identifié cinq facteurs:

- (1) méfiance envers le comité de négociation;
- (2) prédominance très nette du surveillant de district du syndicat;
- (3) activités des factions;
- (4) échec de la procédure de règlement des griefs; et
- (5) inefficacité des communications entre le comité de négociations et les membres.

Les activités des factions ont été liées aux éléments historiques et celles qui existaient au sein de la branche locale ont pu, en se basant sur leur passé, susciter la méfiance à l'égard des efforts du comité de négociations et insinuer qu'il était "sous la coupe" du chef de district du syndicat. Pour les membres, la situation a été aggravée avec le temps par le grave échec du syndicat local lorsqu'il s'est agi de hâter le règlement des griefs dans l'usine. Durant la grève même, le syndicat n'a pas su communiquer fructueusement avec ses adhérents, ce qui se doit en partie à leur grand nombre (10,500 environ) et probablement, en plus grande partie encore au fait que les dirigeants officieux des factions ont réussi à jouer le rôle "d'interprètes de la situation" auprès des membres.

En général, la société est restée assez passive pendant toute l'affaire. La principale conclusion de cette étude est que la grève, de fait, ne visait pas la société mais qu'elle faisait plutôt partie d'une stratégie destinée à faire déloger les dirigeants syndicaux. C'était donc une grève dirigée contre le syndicat. L'influence de la société sur les événements a été relativement mineure en ce que, avant la grève, elle a adopté une attitude légaliste en matière de traitement des griefs sans communiquer de renseignements concernant les effets de l'évolution technologique.

Du point de vue sociologique, cinq facteurs ont sensiblement contribué à la montée de la tension:

- (1) l'inflation;
- (2) l'exemple communicatif d'autres grèves sauvages;
- (3) la publicité donnée à l'opinion voulant que la législation du travail de l'Ontario allait à l'encontre des intérêts des travailleurs;

- (4) les règlements auxquels sont parvenus les autres travailleurs;
- (5) la comparaison entre les salaires des travailleurs de l'usine et ceux d'ouvriers ayant les mêmes qualifications, engagés sous contrat dans l'usine.

Après ce résumé des causes de la grève sauvage concernée, l'auteur en étudie les détails et en fait une évaluation.

Rapport entre les diverses tensions et
le déclenchement de la grève sauvage

Il est indispensable pour juger de l'importance des diverses tensions, de déterminer les toutes premières phases du phénomène; il y en a trois:

- 1) montée de la tension avant la grève;
- 2) la grève; et
- 3) consolidation de la grève sauvage.

Ces trois étapes ne font pas le tour complet de la question, mais nous mènent jusqu'au déclenchement de la grève, ce qui nous permet d'en examiner les causes. La première et la troisième étapes ont mis en cause un public beaucoup plus important que la deuxième. Définissons donc divers publics intéressés et voyons l'étendue de leur participation. Il faut, dans cette recherche nous adresser au groupe qui a lancé la grève, mais aussi à celui beaucoup plus large, qui l'a reconnue et soutenue. C'est d'ailleurs ce dernier qui a pesé le plus lourd car c'est la participation de la masse qui transforme un petit incident de groupe en épisode du comportement collectif.

Montée de la tension

L'activité des factions hostiles à l'administration dans l'usine a été l'un des facteurs clé de la montée du mécontentement et de la tension chez les membres du syndicat. En partie à cause du grand nombre d'adhérents de la branche locale, le syndicat n'a pas pu communiquer vraiment avec ses membres. Les factions en ont donc profité pour se charger de décrire aux travailleurs les circonstances et les faits nouveaux dans l'usine. Leur but étant d'arriver au pouvoir par le truchement des élections, ils définissaient les diverses circonstances et les réactions des agents titulaires de façon à les discréditer.

C'est ainsi qu'est monté le mécontentement vis-à-vis de la convention précédente et de son application, ce qui, en 1966, a servi de base à une méfiance encore accrue à l'endroit du comité de négociations. Cette méfiance assez courante à l'époque, a été renforcée par le secret que le comité gardait pour des raisons de tactique de négociation. Ce secret a été une cause très grave de tension car il a permis aux factions de définir les événements en les présentant de façon à répandre l'inquiétude et la méfiance.

Le syndicat est également resté secret quant aux activités de l'entreprise dans le domaine des changements technologiques, et quant à sa stratégie à l'égard des griefs qui en découlaient. Les changements technologiques rapides et permanents ont entraîné la présentation de nombreux griefs que le syndicat ne pouvait traiter de façon idoine, problème qui a été exacerbé par le retranchement des entreprises derrière une attitude legaliste. Le fait que le syndicat se soit abstenu d'expliquer effectivement à ses membres les raisons de la nullité de la procédure de dépôt des

griefs a suscité chez eux un très vif mécontentement à son égard puisqu'il en a été tenu responsable.

Les tensions venues de l'extérieur n'ont probablement été que des éléments secondaires dans l'accumulation de la tension qui a abouti à la grève sauvage.

Les activités des deux factions qui n'ont cessé de répandre le mécontentement et la méfiance contre le président du bureau en place ont joué un rôle primordial. Ces factions ont fait circuler une description tendancieuse des événements historiques ou de ce qui se passait dans l'usine et à la branche locale dans le seul but de discréditer l'équipe en fonctions, ce qui explique pourquoi l'hostilité s'est portée avant tout contre le syndicat et non contre l'entreprise.

La faction partisane de l'autonomie étant composée de "vrais croyants", visait des objectifs plus larges: ses membres souhaitaient discréditer non seulement les titulaires du bureau de la branche locale du syndicat, mais toute son organisation nationale et internationale. C'est là la différence essentielle entre la faction partisane de l'autonomie et la faction gauchisante. Cela explique aussi la raison pour laquelle on s'est servi du chef de district du syndicat comme "bouc émissaire". Il était le représentant le plus proche d'une organisation syndicale plus large que les partisans de l'autonomie voulaient attaquer. Ce sont aussi les objectifs poursuivis par cette même faction qui ont fait naître l'idée que la branche locale était la proie de la hiérarchie nationale-internationale.

L'analyse ci-dessus ne cherche pas à minimiser des causes de tension comme l'adoption permanente de nouvelles technologies et les problèmes

qui en découlent. Les factions, pour les objectifs qu'elles poursuivaient, tendaient à faire retomber sur l'administration syndicale en place la responsabilité de tous les problèmes qui se posaient et à le dire à leurs membres. Ceci explique non seulement que l'hostilité ait été dirigée contre le syndicat mais aussi qu'elle ait été pratiquement nulle à l'endroit de l'entreprise.

Les factions ont très largement répandu l'idée qu'il ne fallait pas faire confiance aux agents de la branche locale du syndicat. Elles ont aussi insinué que ces agents étaient sous la domination et le contrôle de la hiérarchie nationale-internationale dont on ne pouvait attendre qu'elle agisse dans l'intérêt des membres.

Les factions ont trouvé des arguments remontant à la signature de la convention précédente et ont renforcé et accru le ressentiment des travailleurs en qualifiant sans cesse les événements nouveaux de "preuves" supplémentaires des insuffisances de la branche locale et de la hiérarchie nationale-internationale. En 1966, moment où les négociations ont commencé pour la nouvelle convention, la plupart des membres estimaient que l'on ne pouvait faire confiance au comité de négociation du syndicat. Le secret qu'il gardait sur l'avancement concret des négociations exploité par les factions, a fait se manifester toutes ces craintes et ces inquiétudes latentes. Et c'est dans cette atmosphère passionnelle générale qu'il faut examiner l'incident qui a été la cause première et les événements qui l'ont immédiatement précédé si nous voulons comprendre le soutien très large dont a bénéficié la grève de la part de tous les travailleurs dans cette usine extrêmement compartimentée.

Déclenchement de la grève sauvage

Le déclenchement d'une grève sauvage est généralement lié à un incident qui la précipite et auquel un petit groupe de travailleurs répond en lançant une grève. On qualifie souvent à tort cet incident de "cause", mais nous estimons que sa teneur ou le problème qu'il pose ne suffisent pas en eux-mêmes à expliquer le démarrage de la grève, en effet une grève sauvage ne saurait être exclusivement le fruit d'un incident donné. S'il n'y a pas auparavant une accumulation de causes de tension d'ordre plus général, un tel incident ne peut aboutir à la grève. C'est à ce titre que l'on peut considérer une telle grève comme la fin d'un processus et le début d'un autre. C'est le terme d'un mécontentement croissant caché et le début d'une action ouverte.

Nous avons déjà donné ci-dessus les détails de l'incident qui a, de fait, précipité la grève dans cette affaire, reste à l'analyser comme cause. Mais auparavant, signalons un certain nombre d'incidents antérieurs: une semaine avant la grève, par exemple, un tract dont rien n'indiquait l'origine a circulé dans le service du four à terre, invitant les travailleurs à débrayer le lundi suivant. Le bruit s'est ensuite répandu de bouche à oreille qu'on allait retarder la grève jusqu'au mercredi pour permettre aux travailleurs de bénéficier de leur congé payé, le lundi, qui était un jour férié. En effet, pour être payé un jour férié, les travailleurs doivent effectuer leur service d'équipe avant et après ce jour férié.

Environ deux cents hommes d'un autre service ont aussi ralenti le travail environ une semaine avant la grève, ostentiblement pour une question de salaire.

Selon nos informateurs, on a beaucoup parlé dans l'usine de cette grève sauvage prévue une semaine avant qu'elle n'éclate. On a dit qu'un service d'abord, puis un autre s'y sont préparés. Un agent syndical interrogé a répondu qu'il savait qu'une grève sauvage était dans l'air, trois jours avant qu'elle n'éclate 87/.

Quant aux incidents qui ont immédiatement précipité la manifestation, on peut toujours se demander dans qu'elle mesure la réponse des travailleurs à une situation ou à un incident particulier est spontanée. Dans l'affaire qui nous intéresse, il y avait autorité et organisation. Un syndicaliste m'a dit qu'il était certain que les membres, tant du groupe partisan de l'autonomie que du groupe gauchisant, avaient participé au déclenchement de la grève, même indirectement 88/. Signalons que dès qu'il eut appris la nouvelle de la grève sauvage, pendant la réunion qui avait lieu dans le local syndical, un groupe de délégués est sorti et a constitué des piquets aux portes de l'usine qui n'étaient pas déjà occupées par les grévistes. Ces délégués avaient aussi des banderolles de piquetage toutes prêtes. Les vingt hommes qui ont lancé la grève sauvage étaient tous jeunes et manquaient d'expérience dans la façon de conduire les grèves, et pourtant la fermeture de l'usine principale et de ses filiales s'est effectuée de façon systématique. Comme l'a fait remarquer un agent de la branche locale:

Ces jeunes avaient derrière eux des hommes plus âgés et plus expérimentés. Ils agissaient comme seuls des hommes expérimentés pouvaient le faire; par exemple, ils ont organisé des groupes qui ont fait des descentes dans les usines filiales, pour les convaincre de ne pas travailler. Ils ont aussi découvert que certaines personnes, comme les surveillants, se servaient de bateaux pour entrer dans l'usine et ils ont essayé de les en empêcher: pour cela il fallait de l'organisation 89/.

Le moment auquel a eu lieu l'incident qui a précipité la grève confirme aussi la théorie d'une organisation à la base. Cette grève a en effet éclaté au moment ultime où elle pouvait réussir. Le lendemain en effet, les délégués auraient fait circuler dans toute l'usine le rapport du comité de négociation portant qu'une date limite plus proche et précise avait été fixée pour la clôture des discussions relatives à la convention ou pour le vote concernant la grève. Ces renseignements étaient justement portés à la connaissance des délégués au moment où la grève sauvage éclatait. S'ils avaient été communiqués aux militants de l'usine le lendemain, la grève aurait obtenu peu d'appui puisque les travailleurs auraient pu envisager raisonnablement la possibilité d'une grève légale. A ce sujet, voici les propos d'un représentant syndical:

Les membres du groupe dissident savaient qu'ils perdraient toute influence si le comité de négociation était arrivé avec des recommandations intéressantes. Leur objectif était de jeter le discrédit sur le comité de négociation, le bureau de direction et le syndicat international 90/.

L'absence des dirigeants des factions était très visible dans les rangs des piquets pendant la grève, absence qui s'explique très bien en raison des sanctions juridiques très lourdes qui peuvent être infligées aux dirigeants de grève sauvage clairement identifiés. Les membres du groupe partisan de l'autonomie au contraire ont participé activement et de façon très militante au piquetage dès le début de la grève. Un représentant syndical a dit ce qui suit pour confirmer la thèse d'une organisation souterraine probable:

Les jeunes qui se sont mis en grève ont dû subir une influence car aucun d'eux ne savait pourquoi il se lançait dans une grève sauvage. Ces hommes avaient l'impression que toute l'usine se mettait en grève,

ils ont été dans plusieurs usines mais n'ont pu trouver de partisans 91/.

Bien que le groupe promoteur n'ait pu entraîner le reste des hommes hors de l'usine, il a quand même réussi, avec ses partisans, à persuader les hommes qui prenaient leur service à reconnaître les piquets. A ce stade, le processus de début a pris fin et la consolidation de la grève sauvage a commencé.

Consolidation de la grève sauvage

La plupart des hommes employés à la Lake Steel Company ont terminé leur service la nuit où la grève a démarré, mais les équipes qui devaient leur succéder n'ont pu traverser les lignes de piquetage. De plus, beaucoup d'hommes se sont joints aux piquets après leur service. Aussi, malgré l'intervention énergique des représentants de la branche locale, le lendemain l'équipe du matin n'a pas essayé de traverser les lignes de piquetage. Même lorsque le syndicat a distribué des tracts dénonçant l'illégalité de la grève et demandant aux hommes de reprendre normalement leur travail, ceux-ci n'ont eu d'autre effet que d'engendrer une hostilité encore plus grande à son égard. L'installation de rangs de piquetage semble avoir suffi à provoquer un mouvement général de solidarité avec les grévistes et d'hostilité profonde contre le syndicat.

Le syndicat s'est immédiatement efforcé d'agir comme organisme de contrôle social dans les événements. Il a envoyé des délégués après des piqueteurs pour chercher à dissuader les hommes de poursuivre cette grève, mais tous ses efforts se sont révélés inutiles. Le syndicat avait perdu le contrôle des événements et de ses adhérents, situation qui devait durer

encore six jours et ne se terminer que par un scrutin tenu lors d'une réunion générale du syndicat, le dimanche suivant.

L'attitude des militants devant la grève sauvage a bien sûr varié. Ils y ont participé très différemment, certains militant activement en faveur, d'autres y restant totalement indifférents. Malgré cela, il est remarquable que personne n'ait essayé de contester le piquetage, même malgré les exhortations à la reprise du travail lancées par le syndicat. Cette réaction constituait un rejet de la branche locale du syndicat et de ses agents, ce qui ne s'explique que par les activités antérieures des factions. L'hostilité des membres était dirigée avant tout contre le syndicat.

Cette partie a déterminé les diverses causes de tension et considéré l'échauffement des esprits et les autres étapes préliminaires de la grève sauvage. Malgré les divers facteurs qui ont joué, le rôle et les initiatives des deux factions hostiles à l'administration sont un élément crucial de la préparation de cette grève sauvage et de l'attitude favorable des travailleurs.

Conséquences de la grève sauvage

Les conséquences les plus remarquables de la grève concernent la branche locale du syndicat et ses trois factions, qui ont tous été sérieusement affectés. La grève a également eu des effets très concrets pour les cinquante et un ouvriers qui ont participé au piquetage; les tribunaux civils leur ont en effet infligé des amendes et l'entreprise les a congédiés ou suspendus de leur emploi, mais un certain temps après, elle en a réembauché la majorité, pas tous cependant.

Pour l'entreprise, la grève n'a occasionné qu'une gêne et une scission temporaires accompagnées d'une baisse de production. Quant à la convention même, la grève a probablement eu un minimum d'effets aussi bien sur sa teneur que sur la date du règlement. Lorsqu'elle a éclaté, les parties étaient si proches d'un règlement éventuel que l'on peut se demander si elle a vraiment servi à quelque chose. Elle a quand même incité l'entreprise à revoir sa méthode de communication avec les travailleurs par l'intermédiaire des surveillants hiérarchiques en ce qui concerne les faits nouveaux intervenus dans les négociations. Puisque l'entreprise a attribué la grève sauvage surtout à l'absence de communication entre le syndicat et ses adhérents, elle a commencé à se demander comment utiliser elle-même ses porte-parole pour ce faire 92/.

Le groupe partisan de l'autonomie

Pendant la grève sauvage, le rôle actif et militant qu'ont joué les partisans de l'autonomie lors du piquetage a fortement rehaussé leur influence. La première occasion d'essayer leur nouvelle force s'est présentée lors d'une réunion de routine des membres à laquelle on devait choisir des délégués du syndicat pour assister à la Conférence sur la politique canadienne et à l'assemblée du Congrès du travail du Canada. Les partisans de l'autonomie ont pu gagner suffisamment de voix pour occuper quatorze des vingt et une places dans les délégations. Ils étaient maintenant assez forts pour représenter une sérieuse menace contre l'administration en place, qui d'ailleurs l'a ressenti de façon très aigüe au moment du scrutin ouvert pour le comité exécutif de la branche locale et d'autres fonctions au niveau local, prévu pour juin 1967. Le groupe partisan de l'autonomie constituait aussi une sérieuse menace pour l'organisation nationale par son exigence

d'une autonomie accrue et l'attrait particulier qu'on le soupçonnait de ressentir pour la philosophie de la Confédération des syndicats nationaux (C.S.N.). Pour ces deux raisons l'administration sentait très fortement le besoin d'éliminer le groupe en prévision de la lutte afin de s'assurer la haute main sur la branche locale.

C'est le chef de district du syndicat qui a ouvert le feu contre ce groupe. En invoquant les tracts que le groupe avait répandus dans l'usine, le chef l'a accusé de médisance et en temps voulu a pu faire suspendre ses membres du syndicat. C'est ainsi qu'on a empêché les autonomistes de participer à la lutte pour s'assurer la haute main sur la branche locale aux élections de juin 1967. Ces mesures semblent avoir été singulièrement féroces, surtout si l'on considère la longue tradition contestataire et virulente de ces factions dissidentes. Cela s'explique pourtant par le fait que le groupe partisan de l'autonomie constituait une nouvelle menace pour l'organisation en général. Auparavant, l'opposition se contentait de diriger ses attaques contre les personnalités en place et leurs défauts, sans menacer l'organisation nationale et en restant foncièrement loyale à la hiérarchie internationale. Le groupe partisan de l'autonomie au contraire semblait chercher non seulement à prendre la direction de la branche locale, mais aussi à s'en servir comme tremplin pour faire progresser la cause d'une autonomie canadienne accrue. L'administration entrevoyait aussi dans le lointain le spectre d'une séparation éventuelle du mouvement international. Etant donné ces conditions, on peut conclure que le surveillant de district du syndicat était probablement poussé à supprimer cette menace par les bureaux nationaux et internationaux.

Même si, au début, les syndicalistes au pouvoir ne tenaient pas à soutenir les efforts du surveillant de district visant à faire exclure du syndicat les dirigeants du groupe partisan de l'autonomie, au bout d'un certain temps ils l'ont pourtant fait. Les exclusions ont provisoirement écarté la menace mais au moment où le présent rapport est préparé, le groupe semble s'efforcer une fois de plus de réunir ses forces.

Les groupes de droite et de gauche

Etant donné le rapport étroit qui existe entre les différentes factions, on peut étudier globalement les répercussions de cette grève sur le groupe de droite, le groupe en place et le groupe de gauche.

Le groupe partisan de l'autonomie ayant disparu de la scène électorale après son exclusion du syndicat, la lutte a repris son caractère habituel bipartite de lutte entre les gauchistes et le groupe de droite déjà au pouvoir. Si la structure était la même, la grève sauvage avait pourtant créé une différence en ce qu'elle avait ravivé le mécontentement et l'avait concentré à l'endroit de l'administration au pouvoir et de la façon dont elle avait mené les négociations.

Le groupe des candidats de droite, avec à sa tête le président au pouvoir, a choisi d'entrer en concurrence sur la base de ses réalisations. Il a souligné les aspects positifs de la convention qu'il avait négociée en matière d'augmentation des pensions et a insisté sur la poursuite d'une "bonne administration". Les contestataires de gauche, menés par un homme qui n'avait occupé auparavant qu'un poste mineur, celui de président de division des griefs, ont officiellement soutenu qu'il était "temps de changer", et ont officieusement répandu l'idée que les adhérents avaient une fois de plus été fourvoyés lors des récentes négociations de la convention.

Aux élections du 26 juin 1967, la plupart des membres du groupe de droite au pouvoir ont été éliminés. Trois seulement sont restés: le trésorier, un garde et l'un des membres du conseil d'administration. Le président en place a perdu à une majorité de trois contre un.

Résumé

La principale conséquence de la grève sauvage intervenue dans la Lake Steel Company a été la défaite l'année suivante du groupe de droite au pouvoir par la faction de gauche lors des élections de la branche locale. La victoire de la gauche est surtout dûe au fait que cette faction a atteint l'objectif qu'elle s'était fixé, savoir s'assurer la haute main sur la branche locale du syndicat.

La faction partisane de l'autonomie a vu croître son prestige à la suite des initiatives de ses membres pendant la grève sauvage, mais ces initiatives ont cristallisé de telle façon la menace que constituait le groupe pour l'organisme dans son ensemble, que des mesures ont été prises pour le faire exclure, exclusion qui a, finalement, empêché la faction de participer à la lutte pour obtenir la direction de la branche locale aux élections suivantes.

Les possibilités de conflit permanent entre factions restent très fortes pour l'avenir de la branche locale 08.

Figure 1. Sources de tension en rapport avec la grève sauvage de la Lake Steel Company

Sources historiques	Causes structurelles (syndicat)	Causes structurelles (entreprises)	Causes sociologiques
1. Méfiance envers les agents locaux et nationaux du syndicat	1. Méfiance envers le comité de négociations	1. Conséquences des changements technologiques	1. Inflation
2. Mécontentement à l'égard de la convention précédente	2. Autorité très nette du surveillant de district syndical	2. Attitude légaliste en matière de griefs	2. Influence d'autres grèves sauvages
3. Développement de factions hostiles à l'administration	3. Activités des factions		3. Opinion quant au rôle de la législation du travail
	4. Echecs des procédures de règlement des griefs		4. Autres règlements de conventions collectives
	5. Manque de communication entre le comité de négociation et les membres du syndicat		5. Comparaisons des salaires avec ceux des travailleurs sous contrat

NOTES

